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  absTraCT
The focus on Aid effectiveness and the adoption of aid modalities, such as budget 
support, has put the spotlight on Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Both donors and recipient 
countries are asked to reform their M&E system in line with the principles of the Paris Declara-
tion and the Accra Agenda for Action. These reforms should improve country-led M&E systems 
and enable them to perform their dual function: 1) strengthening (domestic) accountability to 
ensure the implementation of programmes and policies, and, 2) provide feedback to improve 
programmes and policies.  
This paper will focus on one aspect of the M&E reforms: the involvement of Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) in M&E systems, either in an institutionalized or independent way. 
As a first step to understand how M&E in general, and CSO-led M&E in particular, can fulfil 
its dual function, the concepts of accountability and feedback will be unpacked drawing upon 
a broad range of literature. Theories around accountability provide insights about the ways in 
which CSOs can use M&E evidence to improve domestic accountability. Secondly, public policy 
analysis theories highlight the complex and non-linear character of policy-making and change. 
Thirdly, the literature on evaluation use and influence explains the different ways in which evalu-
ation can influence policymakers (or not). Last, the literature on research – policy interface fo-
cuses on the different factors that are mediating the influence of CSO-led M&E on programmes 
and policies. Building further on the main elements of the literature discussed, the paper will 
then present a conceptual framework that aims to increase our understanding of CSOs’ involve-
ment in M&E in the current development context. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 7 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
  résumé
L’attention portée sur l’Efficacité de l’Aide et l’adoption des modalités d’aide, tel 
que l’appui budgétaire, a mis l’accent sur le Suivi et l’Evaluation (S & E). Les donateurs aussi bien 
que les pays bénéficiaires sont invités à réformer leur système de S & E, en conformité avec les 
principes de la Déclaration de Paris et du Programme d’action d’Accra. Ces réformes devraient 
améliorer les systèmes de S & E gérés par les pays et leur permettre d’assumer leur double 
fonction : 1) renforcer la responsabilisation (intérieure) afin d’assurer la mise en œuvre des pro-
grammes et des politiques, et, 2) fournir un retour d’information afin d’encourager l’élaboration 
de politiques sur base de données objectives. 
Le document présent traite en particulier un aspect des réformes S & E, à savoir 
l’implication des organisations de la société civile (OSC) dans les systèmes de S & E, que ce soit 
de manière institutionnalisée ou indépendante. Dans un premier temps, pour comprendre com-
ment le S & E en général, et celui mené par des OSC en particulier, peut remplir sa double fonc-
tion, les notions de responsabilisation et de retour d’information seront précisées, en s’appuyant 
sur un large éventail de la littérature. Les théories sur la responsabilisation fournissent une com-
préhension sur la façon dont les OSC peuvent utiliser les données de S & E pour améliorer la 
prise de responsabilité intérieure. Dans un deuxième temps, les théories d’analyse de politiques 
publiques mettent en évidence le caractère complexe et non-linéaire de l’élaboration des poli-
tiques et de changement. Dans un troisième temps, la littérature sur l’utilisation et l’influence 
de l’évaluation explique les différentes façons dont l’évaluation peut (ou non) influencer les déci-
deurs. Pour finir, la littérature sur l’interface entre la recherche et la politique se concentre sur 
les différents facteurs qui influencent le S & E, mené par des OSC, sur les programmes et les 
politiques. En s’appuyant sur les principaux éléments de la littérature examinée, le document 
présente ensuite un cadre conceptuel qui vise à améliorer notre compréhension de l’implication 
des OSC dans le S & E dans le contexte actuel du développement.8 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
1.  InTroduCTIon
In response to the mounting critique around Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) during the ‘90s and an increased questioning of the impact of aid, a New Aid Approach 
(NAA) emerged, constructed around the principles of ownership, participation, harmonization, 
alignment and results-based performance amongst others. Instruments such as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Paris Declaration (OECD/DAC, 2005) and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (OECD/DAC, 2008) are expressions of this NAA. The shift in thinking com-
bined with the adoption of new aid modalities such as general and sectoral budget support has 
turned the spotlight on M&E. Because donors are moving away from an ex-ante type of condi-
tionality towards an ex-post type of conditionality, where aid is given based on a proven record 
of progress and results, country-led M&E systems are subjected to an ambitious reform agen-
da (Holvoet and Renard, 2007: 67). To be able to respond to the new challenges, developing 
countries are asked to better define and elaborate their national M&E system, to make it more 
results-oriented and robust, and to allow participation of various non-state actors. On the other 
hand, donors are asked to harmonize and align their own M&E systems with the country’s M&E 
system to reduce the administrative burden on recipient countries. National M&E systems thus 
have two main functions: first, accountability, particularly domestic accountability, to ensure 
the implementation of (pro-poor) policies and programmes, and, second, to provide feedback to 
support “the realization of results-oriented, iterative and evidence-based policy-making” (Hol-
voet and Rombouts, 2008: 579). 
Adding to the complexity, the participation discourse of donors has percolated into 
the M&E reform agenda, and governments are pressured to allow broad-based participation of 
different stakeholders within their national M&E system. Various documents related to the 
NAA, such as the PRSP Sourcebook, have elaborated on the role CSOs[1] should play within M&E 
(Prennushi et al., 2002). In practice, however, there is a wide variety of formal and informal ar-
rangements through which CSOs participate within M&E systems. In some countries, CSO par-
ticipation is institutionalized in the form of working groups, forums, steering committees, and 
others; in other countries, CSOs are carrying out M&E activities in an independent way. In some 
sectors, like the health sector, there are joint spaces for evaluation between donors, government 
and CSOs called Joint Sector Reviews (JSR). The promotion of broad-based participation of CSOs 
within the M&E system is based on the following assumptions: first, their involvement is be-
lieved to improve domestic accountability, which refers to the accountability relations between 
government and its citizens (Hickey and Mohan, 2008); second, they have a comparative advan-
tage because, compared to external evaluators, they are closer to the local community and able 
to monitor over longer periods of time, especially at decentralized level (Goetz and Jenkins, 
2001); and last they have sound experience in the use of participatory and qualitative M&E tools, 
which  complements  the  quantitative  approach  that  dominates  most  official  M&E  systems 
(Prennushi et al., 2002). 
Despite the official discourse, civil society involvement in official M&E systems and 
in M&E in general, appears difficult in practice and is not systematically researched (Eberlei, 
2007). Most literature on M&E in the context of the NAA is dealing with the challenges govern-
[1]  For the purpose of this paper, the term Civil Society Organisations refers to a wide variety of organisations, be-
yond non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as trade unions, think tanks, community-based organisations 
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ments are facing when they set up their national M&E systems. The existing literature on the 
experience of CSOs in M&E concentrates on their involvement during the implementation of 
the first PRSP generation and mainly discusses the opportunities and obstacles CSOs are fac-
ing. More importantly, however, is the lack of knowledge and research about the influence of 
CSO-led M&E [2], in terms of accountability and providing feedback to improve programmes 
and policies. 
The present paper aims to fill this gap by providing a conceptual framework for 
studying the role and influence of CSOs within M&E, both in terms of accountability and feed-
back. To better understand how M&E in general, and CSO-led M&E  in particular, can fulfil these 
two main functions, this Discussion Paper will attempt to unpack the concept of accountability 
and feedback for improved programmes and policy by giving an overview of the different ways 
in which both have been defined and discussed within the literature. In addition, a conceptual 
framework will be proposed that builds upon the main elements discussed throughout the paper. 
The aim of the conceptual framework is to inform future research on CSO-led M&E in developing 
countries. Based on the framework, specific research questions and testable assumptions can 
be deducted to understand the ways in which CSO-led M&E contributes to accountability and 
feedback (or not), and the results of their involvement. 
The Discussion Paper is structured in the following way: chapter two is dedicated to 
the accountability function of M&E and its ‘deconstruction’, drawing on a wide range of litera-
ture. The feedback function of M&E will be unpacked in chapter three and four. More specifically, 
chapter three will explain some public policy analysis theories that are important to understand 
how policy-making and policy change occur. Chapter four will focus on the evaluation use and 
influence theories developed in the North, and the knowledge/research – policy interface frame-
works applied to study policy influence in developing countries. Finally, chapter five will con-
clude by presenting a conceptual framework that has the ambition to increase our understand-
ing of CSOs’ involvement in M&E in the current development context. 
[2]  The term CSO-led M&E is adopted here to refer to the array of M&E activities in which CSOs are involved at the 
programme and policy level. It is important to point out that these M&E activities go beyond the (internal) M&E activi-
ties CSOs are undertaking at the level of their own projects and programmes.10 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
2.   aCCounTabIlITy
In the past decades the concept of accountability has increasingly been used in so 
many contexts that its meaning has become malleable and fuzzy (Newell and Bellour, 2002). So 
far, the existence of more than 100 different definitions and types of accountability has been 
reported in the literature (Lindberg, 2009: 2). Despite this variety, the ultimate goal of account-
ability remains the same: to keep power under control and prevent abuses. As Schedler (1999: 
14) points out: “Today, it is the fashionable term of accountability that expresses the continuing 
concern for checks and oversight, for surveillance and institutional constraints on the exercise of 
power”. Within the development discourse accountability has also become popular, which is vis-
ible in key publications such as the World Development Report on improving public service de-
livery (World Bank, 2004), the importance of accountability in the second generation of PRSPs 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2008), and the increasing emphasis on Social Accountability (Malena et al., 
2004; McNeil and Malena, 2010). Further, many donor discourses have emphasized the impor-
tance of accountability for the realization of the good governance agenda, public sector reform 
and ultimately, democracy (Lindberg, 2009; Newell and Bellour, 2002). 
This section will first sketch the different ways in which accountability has been 
conceptualized and defined. It is important to keep in mind that the paper focuses on the broad 
concept of political accountability, which is concerned with “the behaviour of any public official” 
(Schedler 1999: 22); the topic of private or corporate accountability is not relevant for this paper. 
Next, this chapter will discuss how accountability is perceived within the current development 
discourse, by trying to answer three questions. 1) How is the accountability function of M&E 
conceptualized within the NAA? 2) How can CSOs contribute to increased accountability? 3) 
How can CSO-led M&E contribute to accountability? The section will conclude by summarizing 
the main points and presenting the first part of the conceptual framework that will be discussed 
more extensively in chapter five. 
2.1.	 Defining	accountability
As indicated in the introduction, accountability has been defined in many different 
ways across a wide range of contexts. Concepts such as monitoring, oversight, and control are 
often associated with accountability, but they are not genuine synonyms (Schedler, 1999). In or-
der to create some clarity authors such as Lindberg (2009) and Philp (2009) have tried to define 
the core characteristics of any form of accountability. The following five dimensions are at the 
core of accountability (Lindberg 2009:8):
- “An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent);
- an area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain);
- an agent or institution P to whom A is to give account (P for principal [3]);
- the right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D; 
- and the right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions 
with regard to D”. 
[3]	 Many	definitions	of	accountability	use	the	letter	B	to	refer	to	the	accountability	holders	or	the	principals,	Lindberg	
(2009) uses the letter P instead.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 11 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
The last characteristic of accountability is subject to some debate between differ-
ent authors. Lindberg (2009) and Philp (2009), for example, argue that the right to sanction A 
only applies when A fails to inform or give an account to P, but not for the content of the given 
account. Most other authors, however, argue that A can also be sanctioned for the content or 
in other words if they misconduct or fail to act according to agreed standards (Hickey & Mohan, 
2008; Rubenstein, 2007; Schedler, 1999). The latter point of view will be adopted here [4], as will 
become clear in the following sections. 
2.1.1.  Answerability and enforceability 
“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and deci-
sions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct” (Schedler, 
1999:	17)
Schedler’s (1999) work on the two dimensions of accountability, which are answer-
ability and enforceability, has contributed significantly to our understanding of accountability. 
As indicated in the definition used above, answerability refers to the fact that accounting agents 
can ask power holders to provide information about their actions (transparency) and their rea-
sons for doing so (justification). “Accountability thus involves the right to receive information 
and the corresponding obligation to release all necessary details” (Schedler 1999: 15). Receiving 
information not only refers to obtaining data and evidence, for example through monitoring, but 
also to reasoning and argumentation. Quite frequently, the concept of answerability has been 
conflated with the concept of accountability. Enforceability, on the other hand, refers to the 
capacity to impose sanctions, or to the act of punishing the more powerful if they fail to live up to 
their promises or if they are engaged in unlawful activities (Schedler, 1999). Without the element 
of enforceability or without the threat of sanction, one cannot talk about ‘full’ accountability. 
Enforceability thus requires the presence of accounting actors that have enough power and/or 
autonomy to impose sanctions. As will be discussed later on, CSOs usually lack the power and 
legitimacy to comply with this dimension of accountability. 
Although Schedler (1999) mentions in his article that elements of enforcement refer 
to both rewarding good behaviour and punishing bad behaviour, he and other authors (O’Donnell, 
1999; Rubenstein, 2007) emphasize more the element of sanction. If the goal of enforceability, 
and accountability in general, is to ensure that public servants and other actors comply with the 
established rules, then the focus should be on creating the right incentive structure rather than 
on punishment alone. Ackerman (2005: 13) expresses this more nuanced version when he men-
tions that: “The best accountability system is one that includes both punishments and rewards 
so that public officials have strong incentives both not to break the rules and to perform at their 
maximum capacity”. In a similar way Brett (2003) points out that for institutions to be account-
able and perform well both strong incentives and a real threat of sanction need to be present. 
Sanctions come in different forms and degrees and therefore not all sanctions have the same ef-
fect (Newell and Bellour, 2002). Exposure, which is often used by media and CSOs, is considered 
a weak sanction as it does not provide sufficiently strong incentives to policymakers and public 
[4]  If the enforceability dimension of accountability only refers to the right to sanction for failure to give an account, 
in	my	opinion,	this	does	not	create	sufficient	incentives	to	prevent	abuse	of	power.	To	prevent	abuse	of	power	and	to	
trigger corrective actions, which is the ultimate goal of accountability, power holders should also be sanctioned for the 
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authorities to undertake any corrective behaviour or to improve their performance. On the other 
hand, removing public officials from office and imposing economic and legal sanctions are exam-
ples of harder sanctions. 
2.1.2.  Accountability as a multi-staged process
 
“Actor A (the power wielder [5]) is accountable for its treatment of Actor B (the accountability 
holder)	if	A	faces	significant	and	predictable	sanction	for	failing	to	treat	B	according	to	recog-
nized	standards”	(Rubenstein,	2007:	618).
As the quote above suggests, a slightly different way of conceptualizing accounta-
bility is by considering accountability as a process involving different stages (Rubenstein, 2007). 
While the first stage adds a new dimension to the previous definition of accountability, the last 
two stages are very similar to the answerability and enforceability dimension discussed above. 
During the first stage, standards are set, or existing standards are appropriated and agreed upon 
by the different parties. This step is important according to Rubenstein (2007) because without 
having agreed upon standards or being aware of them, power wielders are unable to demon-
strate compliance with these standards or do not know how to avoid sanctions. In the same 
line, power wielders need to accept the standards as legitimate, which may be a problem if they 
are imposed by external agents such as donors. The second stage, which is equivalent to the 
answerability dimension, is the information gathering and analysis stage. It is in this stage that 
M&E plays a crucial role because without reliable and timely information about power wield-
ers’ performance, accountability holders cannot demand answers and justification. In some 
cases, power wielders themselves are compelled to provide the necessary information about 
their performance because of strategic and moral reasons. In many cases, however, additional 
information has to be gathered in an independent way by the accountability holders (Rubenstein 
2007: 619). The existence of Transparency and Freedom to Information Acts can facilitate this 
independent information gathering by creating an enabling environment but the implementa-
tion of such Acts remains challenging (Pande, 2008) (see also section 2.2.3). In the last phase, 
also called the enforceability dimension, a decision is taken whether power wielders should be 
sanctioned, how and to what extent. This phase is important because it provides an incentive for 
power holders to comply with the agreed standards. An additional phase can sometimes occur 
in which the standards are changed or adapted in accordance with both parties.
Although many authors have pointed out that power is at the heart of accountabil-
ity, power relations are often shovelled to the background when pro-accountability initiatives 
or approaches are proposed. Broader social and political processes are likely to influence which 
actors can hold power and which ones are subjected to it, and in turn determine who defines 
accountability, in what way and how mechanisms will be enforced (Newell and Bellour, 2002: 
23). As Ackerman (2005) further points out accountability is a dynamic process of constant ne-
gotiation, not just a state. Therefore, power relations are likely to shift between different actors 
as the dynamics unfold. Power relations also have important implications for CSOs that are in-
volved in M&E processes, which will be discussed in section 2.2.3.
[5]	 Rubenstein	(2007)	uses	the	term	power	wielder	to	refer	to	the	more	powerful	actors,	and	the	term	accountability	
holders to the less powerful actors who are holding the power wielders to account.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 13 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
2.1.3.  Different types of accountability
Besides the variation in definition, different types of accountability have also been 
proposed and described in the literature, each with their own answerability and/or enforcement 
mechanisms. Classifying different types of accountability can occur according to various crite-
ria (Lindberg, 2006; Schedler, 1999). As mentioned before, this paper will mainly focus on the 
broad concept of political accountability. Within political accountability, one possible classifi-
cation criterion is to look at what public officials are accountable for. Examples include being 
held accountable for the use of public money (financial accountability), for legal rules (legal ac-
countability), and for bureaucratic procedures (administrative or bureaucratic accountability), 
amongst others. However, subtypes of accountability are most often organized according to the 
following ‘spatial’ lines: horizontal, vertical and, more recently, diagonal accountability. Wheth-
er or not accountability is horizontal or vertical will depend on the source of accountability, that 
is external or internal, and its relative power. This distinction according to the vertical – horizon-
tal axis is relevant because it takes into account the different implications of power, the different 
enforceability mechanisms, and the different roles CSOs can play within each dynamic. Before 
discussing these types in more details, it is important to point out that both formal and informal 
accountability mechanisms can come into play within these different accountability spaces. 
Vertical accountability can be described as the use of external mechanisms by 
non-state (external) actors to hold policymakers to account (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001: 366). 
In vertical accountability, the relationship between the accountability holders and the power 
wielders is unequal. The most conventional mechanism used in vertical accountability are elec-
tions, where citizens (less powerful) can sanction or reward the current government for their 
past performance. Other examples are exposure of public officials’ wrongdoing in the media, 
and lobbying. Taking into account the direction of accountability between the more powerful 
and the less powerful, one can talk about upwards (vertical) accountability or downwards (verti-
cal) accountability. Within the aid context, upwards accountability is used when governments or 
NGOs are accountable towards donors, while downwards accountability, also called domestic 
accountability, is used to refer to efforts by government to become more accountable towards 
its citizens.
Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, occurs between actors that have 
equal power. Because power is not easily measurable, Schedler (1999:26) proposes to ‘trans-
late’ equal power by looking at the level of autonomy or the degree of mutual independence 
that exist between the actors in question. O’ Donnell (1999:38) defines horizontal accountabil-
ity in the following way: “The existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empow-
ered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal 
sanctions or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful”. As such, his definition 
implies that within horizontal accountability there is no room for non-state (external) actors to 
participate directly in accountability initiatives. His narrow definition has given rise to debate 
amongst scholars and has ultimately led to the emergence of the notion of diagonal account-
ability which will be discussed in the next section. O’ Donnell (1999) identifies several elements 
that can affect the effectiveness of horizontal accountability mechanisms. The first element is 
the willingness and the autonomy of the agency in question to carry out their accountability 
functions, which is also linked to the incentive structure in place. Some agencies may have the 
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element is the presence or absence of networks within the horizontal accountability structures. 
When different agencies, such as the judiciary for example, are in alliance with other agencies, 
horizontal accountability is more effective. Another important element that can increase hori-
zontal accountability is the generation of timely information, which is also one of the ‘tasks’ of 
M&E. O’Donnell (1999: 45)  believes that CSOs (media, research and dissemination institutions) 
can play an important role in providing timely and relevant information without replacing the in-
dependent, autonomous horizontal agencies. He further pleads for the participation of a broad 
range of actors beyond the government in the definition of indicators and the method of collec-
tion.  However, he fails to specify through which mechanisms CSOs can play these roles. 
Synergies exist between horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms which 
are described differently according to different authors. The bottom line is that both horizontal 
and vertical accountability can mutually reinforce each other. Some authors (Newell and Bellour, 
2002; O’Donnell, 1999) have pointed out that the presence of strong CSOs within the vertical 
accountability axis can stimulate horizontal accountability agencies to take action. Strong verti-
cal accountability can also put pressure on governments to take horizontal accountability seri-
ously and to sustain it (Schacter, 2000: 2). Goetz and Jenkins (2001) argue the other way around, 
and suggest that strong horizontal mechanisms can reinforce existing initiatives at the vertical 
level. In addition, the authors point out that some CSOs are engaged in monitoring and auditing 
activities that are traditionally carried out by actors within the horizontal axis. These initiatives 
“challenge the vertical – horizontal dichotomy on which understandings of accountability have 
been based”, and are referred to as diagonal or hybrid accountability initiatives (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2001: 364). Because of the important role of CSOs within hybrid accountability, this 
subtype will be discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.2.1. 
2.2.  Accountability within the current development discourse 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, strengthening accountability is a 
crucial aspect of good governance within the context of international development (DFID, 2007; 
Gordillo and Andersson, 2004). Further, accountability, especially domestic accountability, is an 
essential element of the NAA (Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008: 593). Since the late 1990s, several 
initiatives have emerged that aim to strengthen accountability relationships, despite the fact 
that it is a long-term and complex process. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give an over-
view of all the accountability processes that have gained importance within the development 
discourse. To limit the discussion, we will focus on the relationship between M&E, CSOs and ac-
countability, and try to answer the following questions: first, how is the accountability function 
of M&E conceptualized within the NAA; second, how can CSOs contribute to increased account-
ability in general; and third, what happens, in terms of accountability, when CSOs participate in 
M&E activities? 
2.2.1.   How is the accountability function of M&E conceptualized within the NAA? 
 Within the NAA, the accountability function of M&E is somewhat ambiguous de-
pending on the different readings of accountability. M&E is perceived as a crucial tool to ensure 
performance and improve accountability, and in this sense, it is linked to performance-based 
or results-oriented accountability. This managerial perception of accountability is concerned 
with whether or not a programme or policy has achieved its stated objectives (Lehtonen, 2005). IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 15 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
Similarly, this ‘neutral view’ has also contributed to the more technocratic approach donors 
have adopted towards M&E, thereby ignoring more systemic and institutional or ‘political’ is-
sues (Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008). On the other hand, referring to Schedler’s  (1999) dimen-
sions of accountability, one can perceive that the NAA discourse is characterized as much by 
its emphasis on answerability as its silence on enforceability. Interestingly, whenever defini-
tions of accountability are available in these documents, the enforcement dimension is present 
in the definition, but its ‘implementation’ is largely ignored. Using and creating information on 
the performance of government regarding programmes and policies, and involving CSOs in this 
task, may indeed achieve answerability but not enforceability (Hickey and Mohan, 2008: 239). 
Although M&E is undeniably a very important instrument to ensure and improve accountability, 
the enforceability dimension should also receive attention if a ‘genuine’ improvement in account-
ability is sought after. In general, CSOs do not have enough power to sanction governments and 
the occasions where donors completely suspend funding because of poor performance are still 
rather exceptional. Part of the lack of emphasis on enforceability could be explained by the fear 
of donors to negatively influence the ‘ownership’ principle of the Paris Declaration. Further, if the 
enforcement element is too strong, and “if failure to achieve the agreed targets has unpleasant 
financial consequences there is little incentive to strengthen monitoring systems, which have 
the potential to highlight that failure” (Lucas et al., 2004: 38).
2.2.2.   How can CSOs contribute to increased accountability?
Several authors have referred to the (erroneous) widespread belief that the mere 
participation of CSOs within policy processes, such as the PRSP, will lead to increased account-
ability between the state and its citizens (Booth, 2005; Eberlei, 2007; Hickey and Mohan, 2008; 
Lucas et al., 2004; Molenaers and Renard, 2006). Whether CSOs’ involvement in policy pro-
cesses will ultimately contribute to accountability will depend on a number of factors such as 
the type of participation promoted, the type of CSOs involved, their capacity and the broader 
political structure in which they operate, amongst others (Booth, 2005; Eberlei, 2007; Lucas et 
al., 2004; Molenaers and Renard, 2006). Further, CSO participation in practice is often ad-hoc, 
consultative and without the disciplinary power that is necessary to genuinely strengthen ac-
countability (Hickey and Mohan, 2008). Thus, although CSOs’ participation in policy processes 
has the potential to increase accountability, the links between both are far more complex than 
sometimes portrayed.  
    
Traditionally, the role of civil society within accountability has been located in the 
vertical axis, as discussed earlier. Through elections, lobbying and other mechanisms, CSOs are 
able to hold governments accountable for their past performance. Nevertheless, several authors 
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006b; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005), have highlighted the weakness of 
voting as an instrument of accountability because of various reasons such as information asym-
metry and the fact that voters are punishing or rewarding government’s performance as one 
single package. In addition, horizontal accountability mechanisms are also deficient in many 
developing countries (O’Donnell 1999). In this light, new approaches towards accountability 
that rely on civil society participation have gained importance as a tool to increase domestic ac-
countability. Both hybrid/diagonal accountability and social accountability are two examples of 
such new approaches that are sometimes referred to as the “new accountability agenda” (Hick-
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2.2.2.1.  Diagonal/hybrid accountability
As mentioned earlier, state agencies and other autonomous agencies that are in-
volved in oversight or audit operate within the horizontal accountability axis. Nevertheless, 
some authors (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; Schmitter, 1999) have documented that non-state 
actors can also take up horizontal accountability functions, which has been referred to as di-
agonal or hybrid accountability. Hybrid accountability is not widely studied, but initiatives are 
starting to surface in developing countries fuelled by the lack of trust in horizontal account-
ability agencies and the lack of effectiveness of vertical initiatives in which CSOs are involved 
(see for example Goetz and Jenkins 2001 for initiatives in India). In addition, new initiatives are 
emerging under the impulse of the good governance agenda and the NAA. In some countries, 
such as Ghana, government has committed itself to involve CSOs in social auditing and other 
M&E activities, at least on paper (NDPC, 2005: 8). In this sense, hybrid accountability may be a 
useful concept to work with when studying the influence of M&E activities performed by CSOs 
within these spaces. 
For hybrid accountability to work effectively the following five conditions should 
ideally be present [6]: 1) citizen participation should be institutionalized, 2) CSOs should have 
a continuous presence within the diagonal accountability space, 3) the dialogue between state 
and non-state actors should be institutionalized, 4) CSOs should have free access to informa-
tion and 5) they should be able to disseminate their findings and results directly to the legis-
lative bodies (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). Most of these conditions are also valid for horizontal 
and vertical accountability initiatives, especially the institutionalization of participation and the 
continuous presence of the involved actors (Newell and Bellour, 2002). Another element that in-
creases the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms in general is the presence of champions 
and reform-oriented people when there are windows of opportunity (O’Donnell, 1999). 
    
Last, Goetz and Jenkins (2001: 365) argue that what distinguishes hybrid account-
ability from other types of citizen engagement, such as citizen report cards, is their involvement 
in performance and financial auditing, which are at the very core of horizontal accountability, 
and which challenge “the state’s monopoly over responsibility for official executive oversight”. 
Social accountability, on the other hand, is a broader approach to accountability, which encom-
passes different forms of citizen engagement beyond auditing and performance monitoring. In 
contrast to hybrid/diagonal accountability, social accountability has become increasingly popu-
lar in recent years and will therefore be discussed more extensively. 
2.2.2.2.  Social accountability
Recently, the World Bank has actively promoted the concept of social account-
ability, which they define as “an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic 
engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organisations who participate 
directly or indirectly in exacting accountability” (Malena et al., 2004: 3). Social accountability 
is similar to hybrid accountability in the sense that it challenges the vertical – horizontal divide 
[6]  As pointed out by Nicola Jones the threshold to reach these criteria in practice is quite high, especially in develop-
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[7], but it encompasses a broader range of initiatives that go beyond civic engagement in perfor-
mance and social auditing. 
Referring back to Rubenstein’s (2007) conceptualizations of accountability as a 
multi-staged process, DFID (2007) proposes an interesting way of ‘classifying’ the different so-
cial accountability initiatives. Although the different stages are interlinked, CSOs can engage 
within the following pro- accountability initiatives (see Box 1). Based on the proposed classifica-
tion CSOs involved in social accountability initiatives are not only carrying out M&E activities 
(such as public expenditure tracking, citizen report cards, and budget analysis), but can also 
be involved in policy advocacy, budget literacy, civic education, lobbying and coalition building, 
amongst others (Malena and McNeil 2010: 8).
Box 1 :  Ways in which CSOs can engage in social accountability initiatives 
-  Influencing standard-setting (e.g. lobbying for legislation on transparency, adherence to
  international commitments on human rights)
-  Carrying out investigation (e.g. monitoring and evaluating government programmes through
  participatory expenditure tracking systems)
-  Demanding answers from the state (e.g. questioning state institutions about progress,
  Parliamentary public hearings)
- Applying  sanctions where the state is found to be lacking (e.g. protests, boycotts, strikes or
  negative publicity)
Source: DFID (2007: 5)
Ackerman (2005) proposes a different way of classifying the various social account-
ability initiatives by placing them along six different dimensions visualized as continuums (see 
Table 1). He further points out that these six dimensions are not only valid for the social account-
ability approach, but also for other types of accountability. Depending on the wider context, 
these six dimensions will combine in different ways to constitute effective social accountability 
initiatives. Ackerman (2005: 26) mentions that “in the end, the goal is to construct a healthy 
balance within the overall accountability system in a particular location”. 
[7]  Authors such as Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000) and Perozzotti and Smulovitz (2006a) consider social account-
ability	as	a	(new)	vertical	accountability	mechanism.	They	were	among	the	first	to	study	the	emergence	of	this	type	of	
non-electoral	accountability	mechanisms	led	by	citizen’s	associations	and	movements	in	the	context	of	Latin	America.	
Since the publication of their work, the concept has been adopted by other authors and organisations, such as the 
World Bank. The meaning of the concept has somewhat broadened in recent years, and initiatives to support this type 
of accountability are mushrooming across the globe (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006).18 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
Table 1:  Six dimensions of social accountability
Dimension Extremes of the continuum
Incentive	Structure Punishment Reward




Government	Branch Executive Judicial Legislative
Source: Ackerman (2005: 26)
    
With the incentive structure the author refers to the same dimension that others 
have called the enforcement dimension. Unlike the other models that mostly emphasize the 
sanction aspect of the incentive structure, Ackerman (2005) explicitly acknowledges both the 
reward and punishment aspect in his model. The second dimension takes into account whether 
CSOs are holding public officials accountable based on the set of rules, or based on the perfor-
mance of their programmes and policies. Because solely emphasising the performance leaves 
the way open for malpractices and discretion on how to reach certain performance indicators, 
it is important that social accountability mechanisms monitor both the performance and the 
procedures leading to the performance (Ackerman, 2005: 15). The third dimension refers to the 
widespread acknowledgement that participation of CSOs in accountability initiatives should 
be institutionalized, instead of organized through workshops and consultation on an irregular, 
ad-hoc basis (Eberlei, 2007; Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). Participatory mechanisms can be insti-
tutionalized through strategic plans, rules and procedures, such as in the case of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs); they can also be regulated by law, but this is rather excep-
tional. A last option would be the creation of  special government agencies that assure the par-
ticipation of CSOs within government activities (Ackerman, 2005). The latter option is the most 
common one, as changing the law can be quite a long and complex process. Ackerman (2005) 
further points out that creating spaces for participation does not automatically lead to pro-ac-
countability reforms. CSOs are not intrinsically good, nor do they always have the capacity to 
engage in a meaningful way. In addition, by being too institutionalized CSOs are more easily 
co-opted or controlled by government. 
The fourth and the fifth dimension both correspond to different aspects of partici-
pation. Depth of involvement tries to capture to what extent CSOs are involved in the ‘core’ of 
government activities, which is different from the level of institutionalization. Having access to 
all relevant information about the process and the decisions taken by government is important 
for CSOs, but on the other hand, CSOs should also try to maintain their autonomy. The source 
of funding may also distort the balance between participation in core government activities and 
maintaining autonomy (Ackerman, 2005; Lucas et al., 2004). Regarding the inclusiveness of 
participation, social accountability initiatives seemed to be biased towards less critical CSOs: 
governments are more likely to engage with urban, professional NGOs and think tanks, than 
with trade unions and social movements (Hickey and Mohan, 2008). Donors too are less likely 
to fund ‘controversial’ CSOs such as trade unions to participate in social accountability initia-
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CSOs should be involved (Ackerman, 2005). Authors such as Court et al. (2006: 15), however, 
argue that involving a broad range of CSOs is not enough, because there are internal barriers to 
CSOs (lack of capacity, time and resources) that hamper their meaningful participation in such 
social accountability initiatives. Capacity building, joining networks and coalitions and other 
support measures are necessary before these smaller CSOs can be involved in a meaningful way.
The last dimension refers to the fact that pro-accountability reform is not only desirable in the 
executive branch, but also in the judicial and legislative branch of the government. Networking 
between CSOs and legislators, for example, is a promising path to improve accountability (Jones 
and Tembo, 2008). 
The empirical evidence that exists about the involvement of CSOs in social account-
ability initiatives gives a mixed picture. Blair (2000: 28), for example, analysed six case studies 
[8] and found that CSOs did not play an important role in accountability at the local level. Peru-
zzotti and Smulovitz (2006a: 350) analysed different social accountability initiatives in Latin 
America, and in their conclusion they identified three factors that were related to the effective-
ness of social accountability mechanisms: first, “the mobilization and organization of uncoordi-
nated public opinion”; second, “the interaction among different strategies and mechanisms of 
accountability; and third, the existence of institutions with the ability to enforce sanctions”.  As 
indicated in footnote seven, the type of social accountability initiatives they studied was more 
restrictive than the current broad range of social accountability initiatives. It is expected that 
more empirical evidence will emerge in the coming years, as the support for such initiatives has 
mushroomed in developing countries, especially in Africa (McNeil and Malena, 2010; McNeil 
and Mumvuma, 2006) 
2.2.3.   How can CSO-led M&E contribute to accountability?
While the two previous sections have focused on the importance of M&E for ac-
countability in general, and the role of CSOs in strengthening accountability, this section will 
combine both and attempt to explain how CSO-led M&E can contribute to accountability. The 
NAA has prompted governments to allow CSO participation in a variety of policy spaces, includ-
ing M&E spaces. Lucas et al (2004: 20) comment that “in principle, civil society involvement 
in PRS monitoring [and evaluation] should have a number of benefits. If effective it can indeed 
increase the input and agency of CSOs and improve the transparency and accountability of gov-
ernment action”.  CSOs do not operate within a vacuum, but within a broader socio-political 
context that can facilitate and/or inhibit their effective involvement in M&E. Some of these ob-
stacles relate to the lack of financial resources as well as the lack of time and analytical skills 
to undertake M&E activities beyond the project-level. In addition, many CSOs operate within a 
legal environment that does not guarantee the right to information, making access to informa-
tion quite challenging (Eberlei and Siebold, 2006; Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). The most challeng-
ing obstacle, however, is the unequal power relations in the accountability relation (Rubenstein, 
2007) and the perceived lack of legitimacy of CSOs’ engagement in M&E activities. Therefore, 
it is often difficult to comply with the enforceability dimension of accountability. In other words, 
although CSOs can demand answers from the power wielders, they usually fail to impose correc-
[8]	 The	six	case	studies	(in	Bolivia,	Honduras,	India,	Mali,	the	Philippines	and	Ukraine)	did	not	focus	specifically	on	
social accountability initiatives but on the links between participation and accountabilility at the local level. Some 
elements of social accountability, however, were studied, such as CSO involvement in local policy-making, the institu-
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tive behaviour on their behalf. Thus, the key is to understand how CSOs are involved in M&E ini-
tiatives, and how this involvement can lead to improved accountability, looking at both answer-
ability and enforceability. CSOs are faced with obstacles, but at the same time, they also take 
advantage of opportunities and develop strategies to amplify their strengths and counter the 
obstacles. To start addressing these challenging questions, some elements can be drawn from 
existing theories and frameworks just discussed, but additional empirical research is needed to 
further advance our understanding. 
Taking Ackerman’s depth of involvement dimension, CSOs can embark on the M&E 
journey, either through representation in official M&E working groups and committees within 
the national M&E system, or independently. While the former situation may increase the access 
to relevant information and other resources, the latter option is more favourable for CSOs in 
terms of maintaining their autonomy and being recognized as an independent source of informa-
tion. The existing literature on this topic suggests that institutionalized participation of CSOs 
within the official M&E system is rather an exception (Lucas et al., 2004; Eberlei and Siebold, 
2006). Because of the pressure on governments to include CSOs within their national M&E sys-
tem, interesting dynamics are expected to emerge which show how governments are trying to 
comply with donor requirements while at the same time maintaining their power and interests. 
This point is captured very well in a quote from Gordillo and Andersson (2004: 309): “The more 
power the political elites possess relative to the power of citizens and their political opposition 
and other actors – the weaker the incentive is for such an elite to transform established M&E 
programmes into an instrument for more public sector accountability”. To comply with donor re-
quirements, only like-minded CSOs who are capital-based, for example, will be allowed to have 
a seat within the national M&E workgroups, units and other related spaces (Hickey and Mo-
han, 2008). Another strategy used by the government is the setting up of ‘empty’ accountability 
initiatives to create the illusion that CSOs are involved in public policy and that there is a direct 
dialogue between state and civil society (Booth, 2005). These initiatives “give the impression 
of a government willing to listen, and they inform officials about public perceptions of govern-
ment behaviour, but they enforce neither an answer from officials, nor impose sanctions for poor 
performance” (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001: 380). Such window-dressing initiatives not only create 
false expectations and frustrations, they also hinder the emergence of more ‘genuine’ forms of 
accountability. In addition, governments often try to downplay the influence CSOs could have 
in accountability spaces by saying that they do not have a democratic representative mandate 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). 
Compared to the literature on institutionalized participation of CSOs within the 
M&E system, more information is available on CSOs that are carrying out M&E activities in an 
independent, often ad-hoc way (Eberlei and Siebold, 2006; Wood, 2005). CSOs that are en-
gaged in independent M&E are often supported by donors who promote ‘social accountability-
type’ initiatives. In recent years, a strong subset of social accountability initiatives has emerged 
“that emphasizes a solid evidence base and direct dialogue and negotiation with government 
counterparts” (McNeil and Malena, 2010: 6). This solid evidence is mainly collected through 
M&E practices at the input, output and outcome level. Examples include public expenditure re-
views (input), public expenditure tracking (input & output), and the use of citizen report cards 
and community score cards (outcome). CSOs are thus primarily working around budget process-
es, and the quality/performance of public services (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006; McNeil and 
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hybrid accountability initiatives discussed earlier and will be the focus of the remainder of this 
chapter.
In the case of independent M&E, the challenge for CSOs is to use the M&E evi-
dence they have gathered as a tool for accountability. The obstacles discussed previously not 
only make it difficult for CSOs to demand answers from government, but more importantly, to 
apply ‘sanctions’. However, CSOs use a variety of strategies, some of which are discussed below, 
to create pressure for government to give account and indirectly create incentives for govern-
ment to take corrective action. A confluence of different factors will influence whether or not 
change does occur in the end, but little research is available to elaborate further on this point. 
Rubenstein’s (2007) concept of surrogate accountability offers an interesting angle 
to study how CSOs deal with some of the obstacles they have to face, as a consequence of power 
inequalities. Donors usually focus on reducing inequalities between different actors by, for ex-
ample, investing resources in capacity building and other CSO-strengthening activities. Reduc-
ing inequalities in this way, however, is a long-time process and depends on broader social and 
political factors.  A shorter term alternative to deal with power inequalities is the dynamic of sur-
rogate accountability. “Surrogate accountability involves an actor – a surrogate – who substi-
tutes for accountability holders during one or more phases of the accountability process: setting 
standards, finding and interpreting information, and, most importantly, sanctioning the power 
wielder if it fails to live up to the relevant standards” (Rubenstein, 2007: 617). During the infor-
mation stage accountability holders sometimes do not have sufficient resources or do not have 
access to information to monitor compliance with the standards. When power inequality exists 
power wielders do not have much incentive to share crucial information (Gordillo and Andersson, 
2004).  In such cases surrogate accountability may help in the collection or, more commonly, the 
analysis of data. From a quick glance at the literature it appears that CSOs are more involved in 
monitoring than in evaluation, which is usually performed by third parties such as think tanks 
and independent consultancies, who are then acting as surrogates. Such organisations may be 
perceived as more ‘neutral’ by government (and donors), and, as a consequence, have easier 
access to the required information. It is especially during the last phase, the sanctioning stage, 
that the inequality in power is most felt: “Many prominent accountability mechanisms rely on 
accountability holders to impose or help impose the sanction. As a result, if accountability hold-
ers are weak, accountability mechanisms that rely on them are severely compromised” (Ruben-
stein, 2007: 620). Here again, surrogate accountability can allow third parties to sanction power 
wielders on behalf of the accountability holders while negative consequences are avoided for 
the ‘original’ accountability holders. Within the context of aid, donors or peer-reviewed spaces 
could function as enforceability surrogates (Hickey and Mohan, 2008: 239). The downside of 
surrogate accountability is that preferences of surrogate accountability holders may not be the 
same as the ones of accountability holders, and that the attitude of surrogates can become pa-
ternalistic. Also, surrogates should try to keep a balance between ‘empty’ sanction threats and 
too severe sanctions, which could provide even less incentives for power wielders to share infor-
mation. To conclude Rubenstein (2007) mentions that although surrogate accountability has its 
advantages and can be considered as a ‘second-best alternative’, it is still ‘inferior’ to standard 
accountability. 
Other strategies to transform M&E information into a genuine tool of account-
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vocacy, networking with media and other organisations, and the use of informal accountability 
mechanisms. With regard to the enforceability dimension, rather than sanctioning government, 
these CSOs try to incentivise government to take action through the use of informal, ‘softer’ 
mechanisms such as exposure in the media, mobilization of public opinion, and dialogue. How-
ever, there is a lack of research available on the impact of these initiatives (Malena et al., 2004; 
McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006; McNeil and Malena, 2010). 
  
In	sum, being involved in various M&E activities can provide a springboard for CSOs 
to hold governments accountable, but their mere involvement or the mere act of monitoring (and 
evaluating) is not sufficient. To demand answers from government and, more importantly, to 
meet the enforceability dimension, additional strategies are fundamental to transform M&E ev-
idence into a tool of genuine accountability. The key elements discussed in this chapter are rep-
resented in the first part of the conceptual framework presented below (see figure 1). The boxes 
on the left represent factors related to the broader political context in which the CSOs operate 
and factors related to the capacity of CSOs. In the remainder of this paper some of these factors 
will be discussed in more details. These factors will influence how M&E evidence, gathered by 
CSOs, can be used to hold governments accountable, both in terms of getting government to 
respond (answerability), and in terms of creating the right incentive structure for government to 
take corrective action (enforceability). Some strategies have been discussed briefly in this chap-
ter, but more empirical and systematic research is needed to better understand these strategies 
and their effects. The next two chapters will discuss how M&E knowledge can be used to pro-
vide feedback or to influence programmes and policies. 
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3.  undersTandIng PublIC PolICy ProCesses
The current aid discourse promotes evidence-based policy-making and the use of 
evidence to manage for development results. Within this context, it is crucial to have a sound 
M&E system that is able to generate relevant and timely evidence to inform programmes and 
policies and to modify them if necessary. Providing feedback to improve programmes and poli-
cies, is the second main function of M&E. Suggestions and recommendations on how to increase 
the use of M&E knowledge in policy-making often fail to take into account the complexity of 
policy-making and offer a more rational and managerial point of view. If M&E results are to play 
a more important role within policy-making it is crucial to understand how policy processes and, 
particularly, policy change occur. 
This chapter will discuss some models of policy-making and policy change that have 
mainly been developed within the North American and/or European context. Some of these gen-
eral theories have been applied to study policy-making in developing countries, but, to the best 
of my knowledge, the published literature on this topic is rather small [9]. Some of the discussed 
models of policy change in this chapter are situated more towards the rationalist end, while oth-
er models are situated towards the political end of the continuum when it comes to explaining 
how programmes and policies are created and changed. “Each of these models presents its own 
conceptualization of how the policy process works and, therefore, its own assumptions regard-
ing the use of research-based knowledge in policy formulation, decision-making and/or policy 
implementation” (Neilson 2001: 13). This chapter will also pay attention to the way in which the 
different public policy theories and models explain programme and/or policy change. Schlager 
(1999: 251) argues that “frameworks, theories and models of the policy processes, by definition, 
must account for policy change. Each of the theories comes to grips with policy change slightly 
differently, and together they raise some difficult questions regarding how to measure change”. 
3.1  Rational models of policy-making and policy change
“The process of public policymaking includes the manner in which problems get conceptual-
ized and brought to government for solution; governmental institutions formulate alterna-
tives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and re-
vised. (Sabatier, 1999: 3)”
The policy process or policy stages model is one of the most widely known mod-
els of policy-making. One of the pioneers of this approach was Lasswell (1956) whose model 
describes “the functional stages or phases that a given government policy (or program) would 
go through during its policy life” (Deleon, 1999: 20). The policy cycle model, as currently known, 
is an adaptation of Lasswell’s early work and consists of the following stages: agenda-setting, 
policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy (monitoring and) evalu-
ation. In this linear model, a policy or programme is evaluated after its implementation, and 
depending on the results, the policy or programme is terminated, modified or continued. As Sut-
ton (1999: 9) points out: “This model assumes that policymakers approach the issues rationally, 
going through each logical stage of the process, and carefully considering all relevant informa-
tion”. The quote by Sabatier (1999: 3) used above reflects the rational thinking that is embedded 
[9]  Some more recent examples include a study on the application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework to study 
water policy in Ghana (Ainuson, 2009), and a review study of the ACF in an international context (Weible et al., 2009).24 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
in this model of policy processes. On the other hand, although the model fails to represent the 
non-linear and complex processes of ‘real’ policy making, it does offer a useful analytical tool for 
researchers in “highlighting the various points at which critical policy decisions are made” and 
pointing towards “the crucial factors in policy-making” (Palumbo et al., 2004: 659). The model 
also implies that information gathered during the M&E phase will feed back into the agenda-
setting stage of the policy cycle, and help decision-makers with the policy formulation. Neilson 
(2001) suggests that many donors like this rational model because it somehow diminishes the 
interference of politics. Grindle and Thomas (1991: 122) go further by saying that “a roughly 
linear model of the policy process is implicit in many analyses or proposals for reform” and that 
donor-driven reforms often assume that “getting the policies right” is sufficient to ensure the 
correct implementation of these policies. 
Another contribution to the understanding of policy change is Lindblom’s concept 
of incrementalism, or what he refers to as “the Science of Muddling Through” (Lindblom, 1959). 
This model is not a ‘pure’ rational model but it is situated somewhere in the middle on the contin-
uum. Lindblom argues that most policy decisions involve a series of small steps that only result 
in an incremental change from status quo. “Policymakers do not consider options that would 
lead to radical change. This is because usually, though not always, what is feasible politically 
is only incrementally or marginally different from existing policies” (Sutton, 1999: 30). The in-
cremental model has been criticized for being too conservative and failing to explain how more 
radical policy changes occur (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 172). However, the incrementalist ap-
proach offers a good model for explaining a particular style of decision-making/policy change 
that appears to be quite common in developing countries (Carden, 2009). 
3.2.  Political models of policy-making and policy change
While the rational models contributed to a better awareness and analysis of the 
different processes within policy-making, they fail to portray the far less rational and linear re-
ality of policy-making. To capture the dynamic and chaotic process of policy-making, several 
models have been developed, some of which can be grouped under the heading “policy network 
approach”.  Neilson (2001: 21) explains: “The approaches […] differ from the rationalist models 
in that these models explain policy change as a function of the diverse actors and/or groups of 
actors found within the policy-making system and, therefore, better illustrate the complexities 
of the system”. 
Three policy network approaches will be presented here, which are the epistemic 
community, the policy community and the advocacy coalition approach. According to the type 
of network, the connectedness between its members varies. In general, members of epistemic 
communities are closely connected; they share the same expertise and knowledge base and a 
similar causal understanding of the issues. Epistemic communities consist of “knowledge actors 
– professionals, researchers, scientists – who share common ideas about policy and seek privi-
leged access to decision-making forums on the basis of their scientific expertise and scholarly 
knowledge” (Stone, 2000: 253). In addition, the expert knowledge of certain epistemic com-
munities is highly valued and can therefore achieve a powerful influence on policymakers (Sut-
ton, 1999). Stone (2000) gives the example of the powerful influence neo-liberal economists 
and other academics had on the policy formulation processes in developing countries, through 
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common knowledge, but they are loosely connected with each other. Policy communities can 
be described as “stable networks of policy actors from both inside and outside government that 
are highly integrated with the policy-making process” (Stone 2000: 253). The different policy 
actors are active within certain policy domains, such as health or education, and are trying to 
influence policy-making or decision-making both from within and outside government. A last 
type of loosely connected policy network is called Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). What 
distinguishes this type of network from the two others is its cohesion in terms of shared beliefs 
and values. Advocacy coalitions are composed of “people from various governmental and pri-
vate organisations that both (1) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and (2) engage in a 
nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier and Jenkins - Smith, 1999: 120). 
Concretely, coalitions can comprise of different government agencies, journalists, non-for profit 
organisations, think tanks, the media and business organisations, amongst others (Lindquist, 
2001: 11). Within a certain policy area there are typically between two and four different, ‘com-
peting’ advocacy coalitions that are trying to push for their solutions or views on a particular 
problem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
The three network models are particularly useful for mapping out the different ac-
tors that are involved in policy processes within a certain policy sector and their corresponding 
influence (Neilson 2001: 28). Networks can also be conceptualized as “one route to policy influ-
ence” (Stone, 2000: 250) and important channels for the diffusion of information and knowl-
edge, especially in developing countries where access to information sources is often limited 
(Neilson, 2001). “Networks, especially among and between think tanks and research institutes 
and/or organizations, are an important means for disseminating the policy message that a par-
ticular network or community (i.e. policy community, epistemic community) wishes to advocate 
or push to the forefront of the public agenda” (Neilson 2001: 26). Focusing specifically on policy 
change, the ACF provides a more elaborated explanation than the two other network models. 
In the ACF a distinction is made between changes in the core beliefs and values of the coalition 
members and, more narrow or secondary aspects of their belief systems. The core beliefs and 
values of the coalition, which are the “coalition’s basic normative commitments and causal per-
ceptions” (Sabatier and Jenkins - Smith, 1999: 121) are quite stable and very difficult to change. 
External shocks or crises are needed to shake these core beliefs of the coalition, eventually re-
sulting in policy change. Secondary aspects of the belief system, on the other hand, can be al-
tered as a consequence of research, sound information (including M&E information), or even 
“compelling anecdotal evidence” (Lindquist, 2001: 12). Policy change is thus more likely to occur 
at the level of these secondary issues. 
A last model that is quite influential in public policy is the model of agenda-setting 
developed by Kingdon (1984), also referred to as Multiple Streams model. Within policy-making, 
there are three streams of variables that exist independently from each other and evolve over 
time: the problem stream (perception of problems), the policy stream (pool of problem analysis 
and solutions) and the political stream (external, contextual factors). For an issue to enter the of-
ficial policy agenda the different streams have to intersect at a specific, favourable point in time, 
also called policy window (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 136). Policy entrepreneurs or brokers 
play a key role in the promotion of a certain solution or problem during the short lapse of time 
when a window opens to secure entrance on the official agenda. Policy entrepreneurs cannot 
control when windows open, but they are usually ready to act quickly when an opportunity aris-
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the various streams, along with someone who is willing to invest time and energy to champion 
an idea or a proposal in order for subjects to be placed on the decision agenda”. This model has 
the advantage to take into consideration and reflect the messy and fluid processes that go hand 
in hand with policy-making, while at the same time providing a comprehensive explanation of 
how issues can enter the official agenda and results in new or modified programmes and poli-
cies. This model also “gives credit to the role of ideas - of knowledge and information – in policy 
change, without assuming that governments always take a comprehensively rational approach 
to decision making” (Porter and Hicks, 1995: 23). The idea of policy windows comes back in dif-
ferent theories and models including models of evaluation use and influence discussed in the 
fourth chapter. 
3.3.  Policy processes in the South 
    
A relevant question is whether the discussed theories of policy-making are also ap-
propriate to study public policy processes in the South. Authors such as Horowitz (1989: 197) 
have suggested that the differences between developing and developed countries in terms of 
policy processses “amount to matters of degree rather than of kind”. In a similar way, Porter and 
Hicks (1995) suggest that ‘Northern’ policy-making theories are a useful entry points for study-
ing public policy processes in developing countries. Grindle and Thomas (1991), for example, 
have contributed to a better understanding of policy processes in the South, by trying to adapt 
and discuss existing policy models in a critical way. However, as mentioned in the introduction 
of the chapter, the volume of these types of studies is rather small.  
In contrast, a vast amount of literature is available on the characteristics of the 
political/policy environment in developing countries and on policy implementation challenges, 
amongst others. Changes in the Aid architecture, such as the introduction of PRSPs, the empha-
sis on good governance and the focus on evidence-based policy-making, have stimulated such 
type of research. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature extensively, but 
some relevant elements of the political context and the actors involved will be discussed here 
and in section 4.3. Some of the differences between developed and developing countries that 
are relevant for policy-making include the dominance of the executive branch over the legisla-
tive and judicial branch; the persistence of patronage relationships; the higher turnover of staff 
within government; the smaller amount of research institutions, universities, think tanks and 
other organisations that are able to participate in policy networks and policy processes; the lack 
of human and financial capacity both in governments and non-governmental organisations, and 
the relatively high (indirect) influence of donors on policy processes in the South (Carden 2009: 
5; Grindle and Thomas, 1991). On this last point, Conteh and Ohemeng (2009) highlight the 
debate that exists between those who view policymakers in the South as passive recipients of 
policies developed by the IFIs and donors, and those who believe that this influence is overstat-
ed.  In the section on knowledge/research - policy interface (section 4.3), additional elements of 
policy-making in the South will be brought into the picture.  
In sum, several public policy models and theories have tried to grapple with the 
complex, non-rational processes of policy-making and offered explanation on how policy change 
occurs. In addition, different policy network approaches have drawn the attention towards the 
multitude of actors that are involved in different ways, at different times in policy processes. 
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that offer advice on how to increase the use of M&E results in policy-making, especially within 
the development context. The complex and non-rational character of policy processes should be 
kept in mind when reading the next chapter on the use and influence of evaluation research in 
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4.  Knowledge/researCh - PolICy InTerfaCe
While the previous chapter focused on the complexities of policy-making and 
change, this chapter will attempt to shed light on the links between knowledge/research and 
policy to deconstruct the feedback function of M&E, as explained in the introduction. Within 
the context of the USA, the literature on knowledge utilization emerged during the ‘60s and 
‘70s, after the disenchantment of social scientists with the lack of research use in policy-making. 
The research on evaluation use and influence also has its roots within this broader knowledge 
utilization literature, as evaluation is one way through which knowledge can be generated in a 
systematic way. Because the second part of this paper focuses on deconstructing the feedback 
function of M&E, the emphasis will be on the evaluation use and influence literature, and not the 
broader knowledge utilization literature. On the other hand, there is a lack of specific literature 
on evaluation use and influence in developing countries and, therefore, the recently developed 
frameworks explaining the research – policy interface in the South will be taken as a starting 
point for analysing this feedback function in developing countries. Before getting to the core 
of the topic, this chapter will start with a short section on the different meanings and types of 
knowledge and research to avoid confusion and ‘set the base’ for the subsequent sections. 
4.1.   About knowledge, research and M&E
Many studies regarding the research/knowledge – policy interface are not defin-
ing what they mean by knowledge and/or research, which creates confusion and contradictions 
(Neilson 2001: 7). Although research, knowledge, information and evidence do not share the 
exact same meaning, they are often used interchangeably, and this paper will inevitable fall into 
the same trap. In addition, a multitude of different terms, such as evidence-based policy-mak-
ing, results-based policy-making, and managing for development results, are used to express 
the shift towards a more rational approach to policy-making, based on sound evidence and 
knowledge. The key is to understand how knowledge is conceptualized, “how different types 
and sources of knowledge are put to use, and the opportunities and challenges for mobilizing 
these types of knowledge” (Jones et al. 2009: 6).
4.1.1.   About knowledge 
Knowledge can be generated through a variety of ways: through practice, through 
experience, and through research, amongst others. Knowledge generated through practice and 
experience is often referred to as tacit knowledge, while knowledge generated through research 
is labelled explicit knowledge (Nutley et al. 2003). Several authors have alluded to the existence 
of different types of knowledge, beyond scientific and research knowledge, which can contribute 
to policy and practice (Jones et al. 2009; Nutley et al. 2003). However, for research knowledge 
to influence or inform policy and practice it needs to be relevant, representative and reliable 
(Solesbury, 2001). Thus, although different types of knowledge are recognized as being able to 
influence policy-making, in practice, only one type of knowledge is promoted, the one derived 
from systematic investigation (Nutley et al., 2003: 128). 
Current models of policy-making and decision-making usually focus on formal 
types of knowledge while the role of informal knowledge in policy processes is often ignored. 
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knowledge obtained through randomized control trials and impact evaluations and at the bot-
tom the informal types of knowledge such as community voices (Jones et al. 2009; Weiss, 1999). 
Jones et al. (2009:7) further mention that knowledge generated during the implementation of 
(development) projects, programmes and policies, is an important type of knowledge that can 
influence policy, especially from the perspective of learning and accountability. Within public 
policy-making, there is often a tension between knowledge and power. Politicians seek to secure 
and maintain their power when achieving their policy objectives, which can come into conflict 
with received knowledge about a certain policy they are advocating. Knowledge creation is thus 
a political process that can challenge the existing power structures (Stone 2000: 247). The fol-
lowing quote by Solesbury (2001: 9) illustrates these tensions aptly: “Emphasising the role of 
power and authority at the expense of knowledge and expertise in public affairs seems cynical; 
emphasizing the latter at the expense of the former seems naïve”.  
4.1.2.   About research, monitoring and evaluation
Similar to the cloud around knowledge, the differences and similarities between 
research, monitoring and evaluation are not always clear. Weiss et al. (2008: 29) explain: “We 
often use the word research to refer to all types of systematic empirical inquiry, including evalu-
ation. We use evaluation to refer specifically to research that examines the processes and out-
comes of social interventions”. The distinction between monitoring and research has been ex-
plained in the following way: “Research can be distinguished from monitoring, the collection of 
data to indicate the state of some underlying process; monitoring produces information but not 
knowledge” (Trostle et al. 1999: 104). Monitoring provides information on specified indicators 
and “the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated 
funds” (OECD/DAC, 2002: 28). 
Both research and evaluation generate one type of knowledge, which is system-
atic knowledge defined as “information collected using systematic social scientific procedures. 
Systematic speaks to the way the information is collected, analyzed and communicated. The 
process is based on a logical chain of reasoning linking empirical observations and conclusions 
in a coherent, shareable, and persuasive way with the aim to ensure objectivity, reliability and 
validity of findings” (Alkin and Taut, 2003: 3). Examples of systematic social inquiry are policy 
analysis, programme evaluation and traditional academic research. What research and evalu-
ation have in common is their use of similar methods from social sciences to collect and ana-
lyse data. What distinguishes both is the purpose or intent for which the research is carried out 
(Weiss, 1998: 15). Evaluations are carried out to assess the “worth or significance of and activi-
tity, policy or program” (OECD/DAC, 2002: 22). Alkin and Taut (2003: 3) go one step further by 
arguing that the goal of research is to generate generalizable knowledge, contributing to “the 
body of knowledge in a particular field of research”, while the goal of evaluation is to produce 
“context-specific knowledge or knowledge that is applicable only within a particular setting at a 
particular point in time, and intended for use by a particular group of people”. In this paper, the 
difference between research and evaluation will not be considered as clear-cut and drastic as 
proposed by Alkin and Taut (2003). In accordance with Weiss’ (2008) point of view, evaluation 
will be considered as a particular type of research. Therefore, the literature on research - policy 
interface can be applied to study the influence of monitoring and evaluation (research) on pro-
grammes and policies (feedback function). The next two sections will discuss the evaluation use 
and influence literature in the context of developed countries, and the research - policy interface 
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4.2.   Understanding research – policy interface in the North:
	 evaluation	use	and	influence	
 “Use is a central outcome of any evaluation, because without it, evaluation cannot contrib-
ute	to	its	primary	objective,	social	betterment”	(Christie,	2007:	8)
Although the utilization of evaluation results in policy-making is considered one of 
the main purposes of evaluations “most empirical studies have shown that the direct, instru-
mental use of evaluation results in decision-making is rather an exception than a rule […], while 
various indirect uses, […] are much more common” (Lehtonen, 2005: 170). The focus of this 
subchapter is on evaluation use and influence, and how different evaluation use concepts and 
theories have tried to explain why and how evaluations are used (or not) for decision- making 
and programme improvement. After a brief overview of the early literature on evaluation use, 
newer theories of evaluation influence will be presented to try and shed light on some of the un-
derlying mechanisms mediating evaluation influence. To conclude, the relevance of these mod-
els to explain the influence of M&E evidence gathered by CSOs in the South will be discussed. 
4.2.1.   Evaluation use: a historical overview 
During the ‘60s and ‘70s, the War on Poverty, a large-scale social welfare pro-
gramme in the USA, employed many social scientists in its planning and evaluation phases. 
There was a strong belief amongst social scientists that their research was going to have a direct 
influence on policy-making (Neilson 2001: 3). Slowly evidence started to arise contradicting this 
widespread belief, and soon different scholars began to develop theories and explanations for 
the non-use of research (including evaluation results). Much of the research on utilization of 
knowledge grew out of disappointment and frustration from attempts to apply social science to 
government (Lindquist, 2001: 2; Porter & Hicks, 1995: 6). Examples of such studies are Weiss’ 
(1977; 1979) research on different models of research utilization, and Caplan’s two communities 
hypothesis. Caplan (1979) attributed the lack of evaluation use by policymakers to the differ-
ence in culture between researchers and policymakers. In a nutshell, policymakers value the 
usefulness of information, while researchers value its quality and reliability. Because of the dif-
ferences between the “two-communities” there is a utilization gap that needs to be bridged. 
Suggestions to bridge the gap between both communities include an increase and improve-
ment in communication strategies between both, which remains a prevalent recommendation 
today. Caplan’s model is also known as the “two-communities’ theory”. The model, however, 
appeared too dichotomous – use versus non-uses – to account for the wider spectrum of ways in 
which research knowledge can (or not) influence policy-making. Weiss (1977, 1979), on the other 
hand, developed the concept of enlightenment in her early work, and elaborated on the different 
ways in which research, including evaluation research, could influence public policy. She empha-
sized the importance of knowledge and research in influencing and shaping ideas and widening 
the range of solutions to certain problems, which she referred to as ‘enlightenment’. 
The basis for evaluation use theory was thus developed early on, when Leviton 
and Hughes (1981) discussed the three main dimensions of evaluation use: instrumental use, 
conceptual use and symbolic/political use. The period in which these concepts were developed, 
from mid 1970s to early 1980s, is often referred to as “the golden age of research on evaluation 
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results for decision-making. According to Weiss et al. (2005) pure instrumental use is not very 
common because decision-makers take many other factors into account besides evaluations. 
Conceptual	use, also called enlightenment, refers to the more subtle influence of evaluations on 
the cognitive and/or behavioural level. Weiss (1999: 471) defines conceptual use as “the perco-
lation of new information, ideas and perspectives into the arenas in which decisions are made”. 
Conceptual use refers to situations in which decision-makers and other concerned stakeholders 
find the evaluation useful but do not act or change their behaviour as a result. Some authors 
have suggested that conceptual use may be the “most important effect that research and evalu-
ation have had on policy” (Weiss et al., 2005: 14) and  “perhaps one of the most realistic uses 
of research since it rests on the idea of the accumulation of knowledge through the aggregation 
of findings that promotes a gradual shift in concepts and paradigms” (Neilson 2001: 10). Politi-
cal	use	has many other synonyms such as legitimative, persuasive or symbolic use.  Weiss et al. 
(2005: 13) describe symbolic use as evaluations that “can provide support for policies decided 
on the basis of intuition, professional experience, self-interest, organizational interest, a search 
for prestige, or any of the multiplicity of reasons that go into decisions about policy and prac-
tice”. Politicians and decision-makers use evaluation findings to legitimate positions or deci-
sions that have already been taken (Kirkhart, 2000: 10). Symbolic use is not by definition nega-
tive; when evaluation information is distorted or misused, the term misuse is employed instead. 
Avoiding misuse or misutilization of evaluation findings has remained an important concern for 
the evaluation community over the years. A better understanding of evaluation use through the 
elaboration of a sound theoretical framework could explain more thoroughly how certain fac-
tors and processes lead to evaluation misuse. However, given the complexity and ambiguity of 
the term, attempts to build such frameworks have not (yet) been very successful (Shula and 
Cousins, 1997). 
Other contributions of the early work on evaluation use include the description of 
the different factors or ‘predictors’ contributing to evaluation use, the assignment of weights 
to these different factors, and the development of corresponding classification schemes (Shula 
and Cousins, 1997). However, to contribute to the elaboration of a theory of Evaluation Use, 
classifying the different types of use and listing contributing factors is not enough. During the 
1980s, researchers started to think more thoroughly about the role of context in the utilization 
of evaluation findings (Shula and Cousins, 1997), which somehow contributed towards the es-
tablishment of an evaluation use theory. 
The increasing focus on participatory approaches to evaluation and organizational 
learning is considered as one of the biggest changes in evaluation practice that occurred during 
the “golden age” (Preskill and Caracelli, 1997). This change towards more participatory evalu-
ations also had consequences for the role and required skills of the evaluator, who now had to 
strike a balance between increasing the usefulness of evaluations through engaging with the 
stakeholders, and maintaining autonomy to avoid possible biases or co-optation. The trade-off 
between usefulness through increased involvement and autonomy is still a pertinent issue to-
day. During the late 1980s the concept of process	use of evaluation started to emerge, partially 
influenced by the work on participatory evaluation models (Kirkhart, 2000). Some researchers, 
for example, found that stakeholders who were participating in evaluation practices showed 
greater confidence in the quality of the generated information and also experienced a sense of 
ownership over its results and application (Shula and Cousins, 1997: 198). Until then, evaluation 
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being paid to the effect or influence of participating in the evaluation process itself. “Process 
use is defined by whether influence is triggered, in the language of logic models, by evaluation 
activities rather than by evaluation outputs (i.e. findings)” (Mark and Henry, 2004: 44). Similar 
to the different types of data-based evaluation use, process use also has a cognitive, affective 
or political dimension (Green, 1988). Patton (1997) is one of the most important researchers 
working around the concept of process use of evaluation. In his 1997 work, Patton described 
several possible consequences of evaluation use, one of which suggests that the evaluation pro-
cess can lead to organizational learning. This finding, in turn, has stimulated reflection and re-
search around the relationship between evaluation activities and organizational learning/devel-
opment. Although the distinction between data-based and process-based evaluation is useful 
in theory, in practice there is often an overlap between both or a combination of different types. 
In addition, many evaluation theories only focus on data-based evaluation use.
4.2.2.		 From	evaluation	use	to	evaluation	influence
 
As mentioned previously the term evaluation use or utilization was first used to in-
dicate the data-based influence of evaluation, and was later broadened to also include process 
use. In recent years, following an article by Kirkhart (2000), some researchers have argued for 
a shift in terminology from evaluation use to evaluation influence. The overall argument for this 
shift is that the evaluation language itself shapes our understanding and conceptualization of 
the impact of evaluations. Because Kirkhart (2000:7) considers that both the terms use and uti-
lization are too instrumental and unidirectional to capture, she argues for a “broader construct 
than use alone [...] one that does not privilege results-based use over influence stemming from 
the evaluation enterprise itself [process use], one that does not chronologically limit our vision of 
the effects of evaluation, one that looks beyond the sightline of our intentions”. Kirkhart (2000) 
further points out that influence not only makes it possible to study the unidirectional, episodic 
and intended and instrumental effects of evaluation, but also the multidirectional, incremental, 
unintentional and non-instrumental effects. Evaluation Influence can thus be defined as “the 
capacity or power of persons or things to produce effects on others by intangible or indirect 
means” (Kirkhart, 2000: 7). To explain the different aspects of evaluation influence, Kirkhart 
(2000) developed the Integrated Theory of Evaluation Influence discussed below.
The Integrated Theory of Evaluation Influence is built around three dimensions: 
time (immediate, end-of-cycle and long-term), source (process or results) and intention (intend-
ed and unintended). The source dimension has already been covered in the previous paragraphs 
when explaining the difference and overlap between process-based and data-based evaluation 
use. Regarding the time dimension Kirkhart (2000) mentions that the influence of evaluation 
can occur at different points in time. Both process and findings-based use [10] of evaluation 
(source dimension) can intersect with the time dimension and thus occur at the three different 
points in time. The long-term influence of evaluations is rarely investigated because usually the 
evaluation process ends with the writing up of the report. Long-term influence is also difficult 
to investigate as attribution becomes more complicated over time. Most research focuses thus 
on immediate or end-of-term effects. Intention, the third dimension of the model, refers to the 
need to consider both intended and unintended effects when trying to determine the impact of 
evaluation. Unintended influence is understood both in terms of “unexpected pathways” and 
[10]	Data-based	evaluation	use,	and	findings-based	evaluation	use	are	used	interchangeably	and	refer	to	the	use	of	
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“unforeseen impacts of evaluation on individuals and systems” (Kirkhart, 2000: 11). Intended 
uses of evaluation are often visible in the Terms of Reference or can become clear through discus-
sion with the different stakeholders involved. Sometimes, it is hard to ‘uncover’ the intentions of 
evaluations because they are latent or covert. To illustrate, Kirkhart (2000) gives the example 
of the manifest intention to use evaluation to demonstrate accountability and efficiency to do-
nors, while the latent intention is the reallocation of funds and the downsizing of programmes. 
Depending on the situation, the three dimensions of Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory of Evaluation 
Influence are combined in a different way. With this theory she wants to offer a framework that 
moves away from a “linear, simplistic representation of the relationship among evaluation, user, 
and affected person or system” (Kirkhart, 2000: 18). 
Within the evaluation community, there is no consensus on the proposed switch 
from evaluation use to evaluation influence. Some authors such as Alkin and Taut (2003) have 
rejected the switch from use to influence and argue both concepts refer to different processes. 
According to their proposal, the term use should be kept to refer to intended and unintended 
uses of evaluation of which the evaluator is aware, while the term influence should be used for 
unintended evaluation effects of which the evaluator is not aware. Although the same authors 
largely agree on the three dimensions (time, source and intention) proposed by Kirkhart (2000) 
they suggest changing the intention dimension to awareness dimension to reflect this point of 
disagreement. On the other hand, authors such as Christie (2007) and Mark and Henry (2003) 
are supporting Kirkhart’s proposal and are endorsing the concept of evaluation influence. While 
they acknowledge that the concept of use [11] contributed greatly to the field of evaluation and 
remains important, they argue that it has become so ‘loaded’ and complex that it has lost its 
appeal for empirical research. Mark and Henry (2004) explain why and how the concept of use 
is overgrown, citing as the most important points the overlap between the multiple forms of use, 
the absence of indicators to measure the different types of uses, and the confusion between use 
as descriptive versus normative concept. Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of 
use has made it difficult to distinguish between use and misuse. To resolve this overuse, the au-
thors propose to switch to the concept of evaluation influence, but, additionally they emphasize 
the need “to develop a more detailed and more specific framework and terminology of influence” 
(Mark and Henry, 2004: 39). The next section will explain in more details this specific frame-
work proposed by Henry and Mark (2003) and Mark and Henry (2004).
4.2.3.		 Towards	a	Comprehensive	Theory	of	Evaluation	Influence:	understanding	the		
  underlying mechanisms 
Despite the lack of direct evaluation use in practice, a survey carried out in 1997 
amongst members of the American Evaluation Association suggested that improving pro-
grammes and providing information for decision-making were still considered the main purpose 
for carrying out evaluations (Preskill and Caracelli, 1997). The theories and models of evalua-
tion use highlight the different ‘types’ of use, but they fail to explain why and how evaluations 
can influence or not policy-making. Kirkhart’s (2000) Theory of Evaluation Influence consti-
tutes a step in the right direction, but too little remains known about the “underlying processes 
that may mediate the effects of evaluation on attitude and action” (Mark and Henry, 2004: 
[11]	Interestingly,	the	basic	taxonomy	that	was	proposed	in	1981	is	still	valid	and	widely	used	today.	Unlike	the	other	
models and variations that have emerged over the years, the three basic evaluation uses (conceptual, instrumental, 
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35). Therefore, Henry and Mark (2003) and Mark and Henry (2004) propose a Comprehensive 
Theory of Evaluation Influence (see figure 2). For the purpose of clarity, the figure used here only 
represents a simplified version of the framework; the details of the theoretical framework are 
discussed more extensively in Mark & Henry (2004). 
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The Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation Influence can be considered as a pro-
gramme theory that draws on existing theories of change to explain the link between evalua-
tion inputs and the ultimate outcome of evaluation, which is social betterment (see figure 2). As 
with other programme theories “a theory of evaluation influence can be developed to connect 
evaluation activities and outputs with evaluation outcomes, identifying potential linkages be-
tween immediate, intermediate, and long-range outcomes that are indicators or precursors of 
the specific long-range social goals that motivate evaluation” (Henry and Mark 2003: 296). In a 
nutshell, elements of the evaluation context (evaluation inputs), such as available resources and 
time, will influence the attributes of the different evaluation activities, such as its design, the se-
lection of stakeholders, amongst others. The policy setting in which the evaluation takes place 
will also affect the subsequent evaluation activities. These evaluation activities, in turn, will af-
fect the evaluation outputs, which refers to the knowledge produced by the evaluation and certain 
attributes of this knowledge (the quality, credibility, timeliness).  The theory also shows how the 
policy setting, the attributes related to the evaluation activities and the knowledge attributes 
all have an effect on the general influence mechanisms [12]. These general mechanisms, together 
with the cognitive/affective, motivational and behavioural mechanisms constitute the central 
aspect of the theory (see dark grey shaded boxes in figure 2). Because these underlying mecha-
nisms, called the framework of mechanisms, form the basis of the Comprehensive Theory, they will 
be explained in more details in the next section (see table 2). 
[12] Mark & Henry (2003, 2004) use the terms mechanisms and (underlying) processes interchangeably. IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 35 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
4.2.3.1   Framework of mechanisms
The framework of mechanisms within the Comprehensive Theory thus explains the 
different underlying processes through which evaluations can have an effect (Mark and Hen-
ry, 2003). The effect can result from both the evaluation process and the findings, to take up 
Kirkhart’s (2000) source dimension. To explain these underlying mechanisms, the authors have 
relied on established research from social and behavioural sciences, which “can be a powerful 
source of methods, measures and hypotheses” (Mark & Henry 2004: 51). The framework of 
mechanisms distinguishes between three levels of analysis, indicating the locus of the change 
process: the individual, interpersonal and collective level, and four mechanisms or types of pro-
cesses: general influence, cognitive & affective, motivational and behavioural (See column and 
row headings of table 2) (Mark and Henry, 2004: 39). 
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The entries in the table can be both outcome of evaluation and mechanism lead-
ing towards other outcomes. “Because the elements […] can play the dual roles of an outcome 
of evaluation and mechanisms that stimulates other outcomes, we often refer to them as pro-
cesses” (Mark and Henry, 2004: 43). Evaluations usually start by generating general influence 
mechanisms, which, in turn, influence cognitive, motivational and/or behavioural mechanisms. 
Through the framework different processes/outcomes can be described and analysed that are 
leading towards changes in the behavioural aspect, which is the most ‘visible’ aspect. In this 
way, the framework has the potential to highlight the complex linkages and chains of influence 
that exist and to “describe the pathways through which evaluation achieves its eventual influ-
ence” (Mark and Henry 2004: 48). 
Turning to the three levels of analysis, it is beyond the scope of the paper to dis-
cuss every entry of Table 2 in detail, but some relevant processes at each level will be discussed. 
Changes at the individual level refer to “evaluation processes or findings [that] directly cause 
some change in the thoughts or actions of one or more individuals or […] within an individual” 
(Henry and Mark, 2003: 297). Elaboration, which is considered a general influence process, is 
an important part of opinion formation, which can then lead to cognitive processes such as atti-36 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
tude change. Salience, which is a cognitive/affective process, refers to the importance of an issue, 
and it is linked to the attention a certain issue is likely to receive in the future. At the individual 
behavioural level, new skill performance is what evaluations often seek to achieve: “behaviour 
change at the individual level appears to be an important outcome in some evaluation theories, 
including some participatory and empowerment approaches” (Henry and Mark, 2003: 301). 
     
The interpersonal level of analysis refers to “a change brought about in interac-
tions between individuals, or more precisely, to a process or outcome that predominantly takes 
place within interactions among individuals” (Henry and Mark, 2003: 298). An example of a 
general influence process is justification, which refers to the use of evaluation to justify one’s 
position. This type of influence process has been documented in empirical studies such as the 
one completed by Shulock (1999) and from its description, justification appears closely related 
to symbolic use. The last mentioned general influence mechanism at the interpersonal level is 
minority-opinion influence. This mechanism refers to the process whereby those in minority (re-
garding opinion, not demographics) or those who advocate alternative opinions can overturn 
the views/opinions held by the majorities by relying on the information they gathered through 
evaluations. This process can be relevant in the context of CSOs ‘defending’ the rights of the 
poor and minorities (Henry and Mark, 2003). 
As pointed out by the authors, the column of collective	level is important for un-
derstanding the effects of evaluation on public policy, but the other columns are explaining the 
processes leading up to this. At the collective level, different actors, including CSOs, are trying 
to influence policy-making through a variety of different ways. The collective level refers to “the 
direct or indirect influence of evaluation on the decisions and practices of organizations” (Henry 
and Mark, 2003: 298). Skipping the explanation of the general influence processes, one impor-
tant cognitive process/outcome described is agenda-setting. The authors mention the impor-
tance of media coverage for public opinion formation about the importance of an issue, as well 
as its role in reporting research results and evaluation findings. “More and more we observe 
evaluations being reported in the media in an attempt to trigger a chain of related actions that 
lead to evidence-based policy change” (Henry and Mark, 2003: 303). Borrowing from public 
policy analysis, the issue-attention cycle theory (Downs, 1972) also attributes a key role to me-
dia for bringing certain issues on the public agenda. Policy-oriented learning involves “coali-
tions of advocates who are actively seeking to have their policy preferences adopted” (Henry 
and Mark, 2003: 304). The authors take over some elements of the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999), but they fail to link the elements of the ACF with 
evaluation influence in a convincing way. Policy change, on the other hand, is one of the most 
common goals of evaluation. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to pinpoint the exact influence of 
evaluations on policy change, as evaluations are only one element amongst several others that 
are influencing policy. The last mechanism, diffusion, refers to instances where the evaluation 
process or findings in one jurisdiction are influencing the adoption of policy, programme, and 
practice in another jurisdiction. Both diffusion and policy change are examples of behavioural/
instrumental use of evaluation. 
The types of evaluation use discussed earlier are also represented in the framework 
of mechanisms. Conceptual use corresponds to changes in cognitive/affective and motivational 
processes at the three levels of analysis. Instrumental use, on the other hand, corresponds to 
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attention in this framework, and is reflected amongst the elements of the ‘general influence’ 
row. Part of the reason for the lack of attention to symbolic use is because it not well researched 
in general (Mark and Henry, 2004). An alternative explanation could be that symbolic use is 
more related to fulfilling legitimacy and accountability needs than learning and feedback needs, 
on which the framework is mainly based. 
4.2.3.2.   Advantages and limitations of the Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation  
	 	 Influence	
Some advantages and limitations of the Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation In-
fluence are pointed out in Mark and Henry (2004), while others have emerged during concrete 
applications of the framework. It is important to keep in mind that the volume of literature on 
evaluation influence is rather small compared to the volume on use and utilization, and that 
until now only two published studies (Christie 2007, Weiss et al. 2005) are available that have 
applied Henry and Mark’s framework to analyse evaluation influence. Using the D.A.R.E pro-
gramme as a case study, Weiss et al. (2005) analyzed the different types of evaluation use and 
the underlying processes leading to them. Some of the challenges and advantages Weiss et al. 
(2005) encountered when applying the Framework of Mechanisms [13] are discussed. In the sec-
ond case study Christie (2007) uses the framework of Mark and Henry (2003) [14] to analyse the 
(potential) influence of three types of evaluation information (case study data, large-scale study 
data and anecdotal accounts) on decision-making in the context of a simulation study.  Christie 
(2007) only focuses on the first level of analysis of the framework, the individual level; more 
specifically the behavioural mechanisms are examined, which are important to understand in-
strumental use. She was able to study the influence of evaluation information on the individual, 
behavioural level, but not how these changes at the individual level linked to other levels of the 
framework. No specific difficulties with the use of the framework were reported in her article. 
The first reported limitation is that the Comprehensive Theory is still work in pro-
gress and more details and fine-tuning of the different linkages are necessary to be able to an-
swer questions of why a certain evaluation did or did not produce the desired outcomes. The 
current model, for example, does not pay much attention to the links between evaluation and 
organizational learning. On the other hand, because it is still work in progress, it can easily be 
adapted to provide the foundations for context-specific, local theories of evaluation influence 
(Mark & Henry, 2003). Second, additional contextual factors should be added to the pathways 
to give a more accurate picture. Advocacy groups and partisan politicians, for example, are 
sources of influences that are operating beyond the evaluation process and that sometimes “en-
gage in influence processes that pull in a different direction than evaluation” (Mark and Henry, 
2004: 50). The framework acknowledges the existence of external factors, through “contingen-
cies in the environment”, but it does not offer a complete and detailed explanation. Third, ap-
plying the framework to study the influence of evaluations that have occurred some years before 
appears quite challenging, as discussed by Weiss et al. (2005). Because the events had occurred 
between two and eight years before the interviews, only the behavioural processes could be 
studied. For the cognitive, affective and motivational processes only a partial picture could be 
drawn that was heavily dependent on the informants/interviewees and their interpretation of 
[13] Weiss et al (2005) concentrate on the application of the framework of mechanisms, not on the overall theoretical 
framework.
[14]	Christie	(2007)	also	concentrates	on	the	application	of	the	framework	of	mechanisms,	but	an	earlier	version	of	it	
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the events. 
Besides the limitations of the framework, the authors also mention several reasons 
why their theoretical framework may be useful. First, the framework facilitates the detection of 
the first link in the chain of influence. As with programme theory, if these first processes are not 
occurring then it is unlikely that the desired outcomes will be achieved at the end. It is difficult 
to expect behavioural/instrumental use if influence processes at the cognitive and motivational 
level have not occurred. Second, the framework supports a variety of (future) qualitative and 
quantitative research on evaluation influence. The framework is built in such a way that indica-
tors and linkages are testable and the generation of hypotheses becomes easier. Third, the fact 
that the framework was built with elements from other social sciences may also stimulate the 
use and development of new methods and hypotheses. To give an example, there is substan-
tial overlap between studies about agenda-setting in public policy analysis and studies about 
public perception and salience of an issue, following evaluations (Henry and Mark, 2003: 308). 
Fourth, the framework draws attention to the importance of incentives (motivational factors) 
pushing certain stakeholders to pay attention to evaluations. For example, Weiss et al. (2005) 
found that districts were taking evaluations more into account, partially because of the growing 
importance of accountability and results-oriented thinking within the public sectors. Last, the 
framework not only contributes to research on evaluation influence, but also to the practice 
of evaluation influence. By understanding the different influence processes of evaluations the 
evaluator can adjust his or her expectations and start planning to maximize evaluation influence 
(Mark and Henry, 2003: 53).
In sum, several elements of the main theories presented in this subchapter are im-
portant for understanding the role and influence of CSO-led M&E in the South. First of all, it 
is essential to adopt a broader perspective than just direct use or influence when studying the 
influence of M&E evidence gathered by CSOs. Adopting a too narrow and technocratic perspec-
tive would obscure the array of other ways in which this type of knowledge influences broader 
processes. Unfortunately, many discussions about the role of M&E in developing countries are 
adopting this narrow view. It is often assumed that as long as the information gathered through 
the M&E system is reliable, timely and useful, programme and policymakers will take this infor-
mation on board. “Donors must have a more elastic view of the many pathways to policy influ-
ence, which points to images more like an ongoing ‘dance’ than a pronounced series of impacts in 
a short period” (Lindquist, 2000: 236). Second, the Comprehensive Theory of Mark and Henry 
(2003, 2004) draws attention to the underlying processes behind evaluation use and influence. 
Understanding how the information gathered by CSOs is influencing at the personal, interper-
sonal and collective level is crucial. Several empirical studies on the links between knowledge 
and policy in the South have emphasized the importance of personal relations, and interper-
sonal processes like building trust, communicating, exchanging ideas (Carden, 2009; Trostle et 
al., 1999). These processes are contributing to the acceptance of the work carried out by these 
CSOs. The downside of the Comprehensive Theory is its challenge to study these underlying 
processes in reality, especially retroactively, where psychological processes such as recall bi-
ases can interfere with the results. Last, the literature on Evaluation Use and Influence remains 
silent on the link between the type of actor carrying out the evaluation study and its influence. 
Within developed countries, professional evaluators or specific units within government mostly 
carry out evaluations. In developing countries, this situation is somewhat different because ad-
ditional actors, such as external experts, CSOs and others can play an important role. Is there 
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different underlying processes or different pathways through which the information can be use-
ful? Are some processes more likely than others are? In addition, wider contextual factors that 
have not been discussed extensively in this subchapter are different in developing countries. The 
next subchapter will pay more attention to these contextual factors and present the literature 
on the research - policy links within developing countries. 
4.3.   Understanding research – policy interface in developing countries 
The existing literature on evaluation use and influence just discussed has not yet 
been studied in the context of developing countries. To understand better which factors are me-
diating the relationship between M&E and policy in developing countries, this subchapter will 
adopt a broader perspective and discuss existing research – policy interface frameworks. Al-
though most of the research –policy literature is also written from the perspective of developed 
countries, literature on this topic in the context of developing countries is growing, especially un-
der the impulse of the RAPID group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (Chowdhury 
et al., 2006; Court and Cotterrell, 2006; Court and Young, 2003; Court and Young, 2004; Jones 
et al., 2009). In addition, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is working on 
the development of a new framework based on a long-term cross-country study about the influ-
ence of research findings on policy processes (Carden, 2004; Carden, 2009).  Both researches 
are valuable to understand the different factors that contribute to the uptake of knowledge/
research into policies and programmes and will be presented in this section of the paper. As 
CSOs generate M&E evidence/knowledge using techniques and methods from social sciences, 
these frameworks are helpful to increase our understanding of the feedback function of M&E. 
More specifically, these frameworks could be useful to explore the case of CSOs carrying out 
independent M&E activities, as they have to develop strategies to bring the M&E evidence to 
the attention of policymakers. 
4.3.1.   The RAPID framework
The RAPID framework was established following an extensive literature review on 
research - policy links (de Vibe et al., 2002), and a number of studies in which the framework 
was applied to analyse a broad range of cases (Chowdhury et al. 2006; Court & Young, 2003). 
To reflect the non-linear, complex and dynamic character of the research – policy interface, the 
RAPID framework drew inspiration from multidimensional models, such as the one developed 
by Kitson et al.(1998) [15] (Crewe and Young, 2002: 4).  The RAPID framework (see figure 3) 
identifies four broad areas that are important for understanding why some research is able to 
enter the policy-making arena, while other research fails to do so (Court and Young, 2003; Court 
and Young, 2004): the political context, the evidence, the links between the policy and research 
community, and a fourth area related to external factors. Court and Young (2003: 2) further 
emphasize that “the framework should be seen as a generic, perhaps ideal, model” for studying 
and understanding research – policy links. 
 
[15]	Kitson	et	al.	(1998:	150)	proposed	a	three-dimensional	formula	and	framework	to	explain	the	successful	imple-
mentation (SI) of evidence in practice:  SI = f (E, C, F), where f= function of, E= Evidence, C = Context, and F= Facilitation40 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
Figure 3:  The RAPID framework







Source: Adapted from Court and Young (2004: 2)
Figure 3 shows the combination of RAPID’s conceptual framework, at the outside 
of the circles, and its practical framework, at the inside of the circles. Creating links, for exam-
ple, translates into the practice of building network and coalitions, working with media, and 
undertaking advocacy work, amongst others (Young, 2007). The process of policy analysis and 
research, which includes M&E, is located at the intersection of the evidence and the political 
context circles. The practical framework is a useful tool for stakeholders who want to influence 
certain policies, but for the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on explaining the conceptual 
framework. 
Within a developing context, the external	influences refer to the influence of in-
ternational agreements and declarations, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
the PD and the AAA, on national policy processes. The influence of the donor community and 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) also falls within this category. Although there is 
a move away from the strict policy conditionality that characterised the SAPs, the donor com-
munity is still able “to encourage and enforce changes in policy content and processes” (Jones 
et al. 2009:12). Some examples include the elaboration of PRSPs as a condition for debt relief, 
and the ‘imposed’ broad-based participation within policy processes as a condition for receiving 
aid (Molenaers and Renard, 2006: 7). Policymakers in the South, usually have less autonomy de-
spite the prevailing discourse of ownership (Carden, 2009: 4). On the other hand, although the 
PRSP process can be criticized on various points, it has also provided a window of opportunity 
for (some) CSOs to access and engage in policy processes (Oxfam, 2002).
Political context refers to a broad range of factors organized around the clusters 
of ‘politics’ and ‘policy-making’. The underlying idea is that all these factors will influence, directly 
or indirectly, the ‘room for manoeuvre’ of non-state actors within policy processes [16]. Some 
examples include: “the nature of the political system, the level of democratic competition, the 
strength of government leadership, the relative strength of interest groups, incentive structures 
within policy-making organisations, capacities of both policymakers and institutions, the level 
of influence of external actors” (Jones et al. 2009: 10), “political freedoms, academic and media 
freedoms; pro-poor commitment of the elite or government and culture of evidence use” (Court 
[16] The idea that different elements within the political context can facilitate or inhibit access to the political system 
is also at the heart of political opportunity or political process approaches.  Political context, however, offers a more 
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and Cotterrell, 2006: vii). From a practical point of view, for several of these indicators data is 
already available and published periodically; for example, the Freedom of Press Index as a proxy 
for media freedom within a particular country and the governance indicators published by the 
World Bank [17]. Some factors within the political context area are linked more specifically to 
policy processes. Chapter three of the paper already outlined some general characteristics of poli-
cy-making in the South, but a few additional points will be presented here: First, within a certain 
policy domain, there are different policy regimes or decision regimes. Lindquist (1990: 43) pro-
poses the following broad typology of regime types: routine decisions, when there is “significant 
consensus on prevailing policy”; incremental decisions, when there is “substantial consensus on 
the policy base but there is the presence of selective issues that merit the attention of interested 
policymakers”, and fundamental decisions, “when a significant departure from the policy base 
is considered or occurs”, for example in the case of new policy areas. The type of decision regime 
will induce preferences for certain types of knowledge at the expense of other types. For exam-
ple, in routine and incremental decision regimes, information that slightly challenges or modifies 
existing policy preferences will be more easily accepted. “Routinists prefer information that re-
inforces preformed opinions and expectations, incrementalists only want to know what will get 
them through another day or controversy” (Carden 2009:22). The type of information policy-
makers are seeking in this situation is focused information, or ‘ data and analysis’, to take up the 
terminology of Lindquist (1990: 44). In contrast, research that is innovative or that challenges 
the underlying values and logic of the existing policies are more likely to be considered in open 
decision regimes such as “fundamental decision regimes” (Lindquist, 1990; Carden, 2009). 
Second, there are differences in ‘openness’ across policy domains. Some sectors, 
such as the education sector, are more open to participation and to multiple sources of evidence; 
others such as macro-economic policies are more closed to participation (Jones et al. 2009: 16). 
The same authors have identified certain key variables to explain these variations across sec-
tors: “i) the level of technical expertise required to participate in policy debates, ii) the relative 
influence of economic interests in shaping policy dialogues, iii) the level of contestation in the 
sector, and iv) the extent to which policy discourses are internationalised” (Jones et al. 2009: 
16). A related concept that helps to explain the different sectoral dynamics is the distinction be-
tween ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. “The term high politics is used to relate to important policy deci-
sions, such as, whether a currency should be devalued. In these cases, the policy-making pro-
cess is closed, with only a small group of influential people consulted, usually from within certain 
epistemic communities. In issues of low politics, which are of less importance to nation states, a 
wider set of groups are considered, incorporating various societal bodies” (Sutton 1999: 16). Be-
sides the variations in openness between different policy sectors, the venue at which decisions 
are taken also changes, some decisions are taken at the central level, while others are taken at 
the decentralized level (Carden, 2009). In practice, CSOs should be aware of these differences 
when trying to bring certain issues to the attention of policymakers.  
Factors related to evidence refer to both the characteristics of the evidence [18], 
and the communication strategies employed (Court and Young, 2003; Court and Young, 2004). 
Because the RAPID framework has been elaborated based on a sound body of theoretical and 
empirical work, a broad understanding of evidence is adopted. Not only academic research 
[17] These indicators are available on the following website: www.govindicators.org
[18]	In	a	similar	way,	the	importance	of	knowledge	attributes	for	policy	influence	has	also	been	recognized	in	Mark	and	
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but also other types of knowledge are represented within this ‘evidence circle’, including M&E 
knowledge. The physical location of M&E knowledge within the RAPID framework is indicated 
with the arrow (see figure 3). Attributes of the evidence, such as its credibility, quality, timeliness, 
and the like, will facilitate or inhibit the uptake within policy-making. Interestingly, within de-
veloping countries, the high credibility and quality of research does not always link to publishing 
in peer-reviewed journals, but can be based on reputation of the individual researcher or the in-
stitutions he/she belongs to (Trostle et al. 1999). Neilson (2001: 41) further suggests that there 
might be a trade-off between the production of “high quality research by outsiders” and “indig-
enous research that may be of lower quality” and therefore has less impact. Factors related to 
the way in which researchers/organisations communicate their findings also influences policy 
uptake. Because communication strategies have been discussed more extensively by Carden 
(2009), they will not be presented here, but in section 4.3.2. 
The last group of factors, links, relates to the key stakeholders involved from both 
the research and the policy community, and the existing and emerging links between them. 
When analysing the different stakeholders involved and the links between them, both influence 
and legitimacy issues should be considered. Jones et al. (2009: 20) point out that the range of 
actors involved in policy-making has increased and diversified during the past decades (Jones 
et al. 2009: 20). Besides CSOs and INGOs, networks and think tanks have received growing at-
tention in the last years. The proliferation of think tanks in developing countries can be partially 
attributed to the shift towards evidence-based policy-making and the increasing support of do-
nors to this type of organisations as a way to bridge policy and research (Lindquist, 2000; Stone, 
2000). Policy network approaches (for example epistemic communities, advocacy coalition 
frameworks and others), which have been explained in the third chapter, are able to shed light 
on some of the ways in which policymakers and researchers are linked. Another approach is to 
study how network characteristics influence research – policy interactions (Mendizabal, 2006). 
The structure of a network, for example, will facilitate or inhibit interactions with other organisa-
tions, and policymakers, and consequently their ability to influence policy. Networks also have 
advantages in terms of information flows, knowledge sharing and communication (Jones et al. 
2009). Case studies carried out by the IDRC (Carden, 2009) suggested that networks, consist-
ing of both policymakers and researchers, appeared more successful in integrating research into 
policy-making. Thus, the involvement of government policymakers and bureaucrats within the 
network seems to contribute to stronger research – policy linkages.
In sum, the RAPID framework draws attention to a wide variety of factors that are 
relevant for understanding the relation between research and policy in developing countries. 
From a practical point of view, it also provides entry points for researchers and CSOs who want 
to increase the influence of their work on policy. The next section will present work in progress 
by the IDRC that partially overlaps with the RAPID framework, but also complements it by fo-
cusing on strategies researchers/research organisations are adopting to influence policy within 
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4.3.2.		 The	IDRC	research	on	the	influence	of	research	on	policy
Based on the results of a long-term cross-country evaluation, the IDRC research 
team is developing a framework to better understand the influence of research on policy (Carden 
2004, 2009). A realistic evaluation approach (Pawson and Tilly, 1997) was adopted to analyse 
and evaluate 23 best practice cases, using the context-mechanisms-outcomes (CMO) configu-
ration [19] to explain policy influence (see figure 4) (Carden, 2010). As was the case with the RAP-
ID framework, a broad conceptualization of the term policy influence, beyond actual changes in 
programmes and policies, was adopted in the IDRC research. The typology used at the outcome 
level in the figure is based on Lindquist (2001:24) who discerns three types of policy influence: 
expanding policy capacities, broadening ‘policy horizons’, which is similar to enlightenment, 
and affecting policy regimes, which refers to the actual change of programmes or policies. The 
large-scale IDRC evaluation study illustrates the two-way interaction between the strategies 
researchers/research organisations are adopting to influence policy and the context in which 
they operate. Depending on the context, certain strategies or mechanisms [20] will be more or 
less successful in achieving a certain outcome, in this case policy influence. The results of the 
research can be considered as a starting point for studying the strategies that CSOs are adopt-
ing to bring M&E results to the attention of policymakers, and ultimately improve programmes 
and policies. 
Figure 4:  Realist perspective of policy influence
 
Source: Adapted from Carden (2010) 
    
Within the context, Carden (2009) distinguishes between overall and decision con-
text. Several factors related to the overall context, have been mentioned previously in this paper, 
especially when discussing the political context of the RAPID framework. Decision context, on 
the other hand, refers to five possible ‘receptivity’ categories that were constructed based on 
[19] The realistic evaluation approach understands causality in the following way “to infer a causal outcome (O) be-
tween	two	events	[in	the	IDRC	case:	research	and	policy	influence],	one	needs	to	understand	the	underlying	mecha-
nisms (M) that connects them and the context (C) in which the relationship occurs” (Pawson et al., 2005: 21 - 22).
[20] In Figure 4, the term mechanisms is used in line with the terminology of Realistic Evaluation. However, in the 
IDRC	study,	these	mechanisms	correspond	to	strategies	researchers	and	their	organisations	have	adopted	to	influence	
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the results of the large-scale IDRC evaluation. The receptivity categories represent the ‘openess’ 
of policymakers towards research (Carden, 2009: 23). In the first situation, the policy window is 
wide open for research with a clear demand of government. This situation occurs with “familiar 
and recurring issues”, or, conversely, in very new and unfamiliar situations. In the next two situ-
ations, the policy window is half-open; governments are interested in research but either leader-
ship or (human and financial) capacity is missing to respond to the research and implement it. In 
the fourth situation, which is the most common in developing countries according to the author, 
new and exciting research is available and has the potential to solve development problems, but 
policymakers are not interested. The last situation refers to the case in which government has a 
hostile or disinterested attitude towards research or in which “the window of influence is tightly 
closed” (Carden 2009: 24). Importantly, the different receptivity scenarios are dynamic and can 
evolve towards a more open or closed situation during the lifespan of the research carried out.
The IDRC research suggests that “each of these classes of receptivity calls for de-
finable strategies by which researchers and research advocates can maximize their prospects 
of influencing public policy and development action” (Carden 2009: 25). Nonetheless, the re-
lationship between receptivity and policy influence is not perfectly linear as other contextual 
elements are at play. The mechanisms box in figure 4 contains the main strategies employed by 
researchers/research organisations, but in the discussion of the IDRC evaluation results (Carden, 
2009), a wider range of adopted strategies are identified. In the first receptivity category, when 
the demand side for research of the government is high, trust appears to be the most important 
strategic asset of the researcher/research organisation. Trust usually goes hand in hand with re-
liability, reputation and with building and consolidating relationships with policy community actors.  
In situations where the policy window is half-open and leadership is missing (category two), re-
searchers and networks need to play an active role in strengthening institutional mechanisms to 
ensure implementation of the proposed recommendations. At the same time, communication 
with decision-makers is also crucial (Carden 2009: 29). When the policy window is half-open 
and capacity is missing, researchers that engage in capacity building and create broad popular 
support for the research (project) through advocacy, education and communication, appear to 
be more successful in influencing policy. When receptivity for research is low (fourth category), 
a more complex strategy is required on three fronts; first, the evidence gathered should be of 
high quality and credibility; second, a coherent advocacy plan should be developed to bring the 
issue to the attention of the policymaker, and third, popular support for the research (project) 
should be gathered through different channels (radio, meetings) with as goal to “transform of-
ficial indifference into attentive deliberation and action” (Carden 2009: 30). The idea is to try 
to create a small window of opportunity for policy influence. When the window is tightly closed, 
as in the last situation, patience and persistence are the main message to researchers/research 
organisations. 
In several frameworks and approaches, including the ones developed by ODI and 
IDRC, communication is considered a key strategy to increase the uptake of research in policy. 
Having a good communication plan tailored to the needs of the different users, is also a popular 
recommendation in M&E handbooks. The two frameworks just discussed highlight the many 
different ways, through both formal and informal channels, in which research can be communi-
cated. First, communication goes beyond mere dissemination and involves the ‘translation’ or 
‘repackaging’ of the knowledge into a language that is better understood by policymakers and 
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manent dialogue or forum for exchange contributes to a continuous exchange of information 
between researchers/research organisations and policymakers, which is conducive to policy 
influence (Carden 2009). The need to establish a permanent dialogue between CSOs and gov-
ernment officials is also recognized as a strategy to strengthen domestic accountability (as 
discussed in chapter 2). Third, within developing countries, professionals switch more easily 
between academic/research, political and non-profit careers (Carden, 2009: 46; Trostle et al., 
1999:10). Lindquist (1990) already noticed that this mobility may increase even more because 
of the limited number of highly qualified professionals in developing countries. Thus the high 
professional mobility becomes an informal channel through which knowledge can be shared and 
transmitted between the different spheres. Last, the formation of formal and informal networks 
is also recognized as a crucial channel for communication, as mentioned previously, and this 
across the different receptivity categories. Carden (2004, 2009) thus encourages researchers in 
the South to take a more pro-active stance, when trying to influence policy-making, by estab-
lishing relations and trust, developing sound communication strategies and building networks. 
Porter and Hick (1995: 9), in a different study, go a step further by suggesting that researchers 
and analysts should abandon their ‘neutrality mask’ and take up a more active and committed 
role if they want to have an impact on policy-making that goes beyond enlightenment. 
In	sum, while the RAPID framework provides a useful tool for taking into account 
different groups of factors when studying the uptake of evidence within policy processes, the re-
search by IDRC sheds light on possible influence strategies Southern organisations are adopting 
depending on the context. For example, in situations where government displays a low receptiv-
ity for M&E evidence that has been gathered independently by CSOs, one can assume that CSOs 
are more likely to adopt a complex combination of strategies to maximize the influence of their 
M&E evidence. 
The feedback dimension of the proposed conceptual framework (see figure 5) takes 
up some of the elements that were presented in the comprehensive fourth chapter. It builds 
further upon Mark and Henry’s (2004) framework but complements it with elements of the re-
search carried out by ODI and IDRC to adapt it to the context of developing countries. As men-
tioned in the short summary following the section on evaluation use and influence, one of the 
most important contributions of this literature has been a broadening of the understanding of 
the ways in which evaluation/research can influence policy, and the attention towards the un-
derlying mechanisms explaining this influence. Therefore, the feedback function box of the pro-
posed framework has been opened up to include the broad categories of underlying mechanisms 
that mediate M&E use and influence, as explained by the Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation 
Influence (Henry and Mark, 2003; Mark and Henry, 2004). The work of ODI and IDRC, on the 
other hand, focuses on understanding contextual factors that increase the uptake of research 
into policy-making and on highlighting some of the strategies researchers and CSOs are using 
to respond to challenges and opportunities in the context. The important contextual factors are 
represented in the framework by the boxes external influence and political context. This way, 
they compensate for the weaker point of Mark and Henry’s framework, which was the lack of 
attention to contextual factors. A third box, CSO capacity, was added to capture the effects of 
internal capacity and contraints CSOs are facing when they engage in M&E activities and pro-
duce M&E evidence. As in the RAPID framework, the ‘M&E evidence circle’ refers to attributes 
of the gathered evidence (credibility, timeliness, etc) and the way in which the M&E evidence is 
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IDRC research, CSOs can actively bring the evidence they gathered through M&E activities to 
the attention of policymakers. In a way CSO strategies have the potential to increase the occur-
rence of some of the underlying mechanisms identified in the framework. Thus CSOs involved in 
M&E are adopting a more proactive stance than is the case with professional evaluators carry-
ing out evaluations in developed countries.      
Figure 5:  Conceptual framework – feedback dimension
  The last chapter of this paper will present the complete conceptual framework and 
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5.   ConClusIon: Towards an undersTandIng of Csos’
  InvolvemenT In m&e
The present paper has attempted to unpack the two main functions of M&E, which 
are accountability and feedback for improved programmes and policy, by relying on a broad 
range of literature across disciplines. More importantly, key elements from the literature dis-
cussed were combined to create a conceptual framework (see figure 6) that aims to increase our 
understanding of CSOs’ involvement in M&E in the current development context. As mentioned 
in the introduction, most research on CSO-led M&E has focused on obstacles and opportunities 
CSOs are facing when they carry out various M&E activities. The outcome of such activities in 
terms of strenghtening (domestic) accountability and influencing programmes and policies in 
the broad sense of the word, has not yet been studied extensively. The proposed framework 
could help with the generation of specific research questions and testable assumptions to in-
crease our understanding of this topic. 
Figure 6:  Understanding CSOs’ involvement in M&E
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Some of the most important elements from each chapter are summarized below. 
In a way, these elements can be considered as the building blocks for the proposed conceptual 
framework. In the second chapter, the two dimensions of accountability, which are answerabil-
ity and enforceability, have been highlighted and discussed. In addition, the concept of social 
accountability has proved useful to understand how CSOs can strengthen domestic account-
ability, especially those CSOs that are involved in various M&E activities. The literature has also 
highlighted some of the obstacles and opportunities CSOs are facing when trying to demand 
answers from government or, more importantly, create the right incentive structure for govern-
ment to take action. The two dimensions of accountability, and the strategies CSOs are employ-
ing to turn M&E evidence into a tool for domestic accountability are represented in the frame-
work. The third chapter emphasized the complex and non-linear character of policy-making, and 
the multitude of actors involved in policy processes in both developed and developing countries. 
From the literature it appears that most policy changes consist of small (incremental) changes, 
and that fundamental policy changes are rather rare. The importance of crisis and policy win-
dows for policy change is also underlined. The fourth chapter focused on explaining the feedback 
function of M&E by relying on the literature about evaluation use and influence, and knowledge/
research – policy interface literature discussed in the context of developing countries. The lit-
erature on evaluation use and influence broadens the understanding of the concept ‘evaluation 
use and influence’ beyond instrumental/behavioural changes. Most evaluations do not result in 
concrete programme/policy changes, but generate important changes at the conceptual/cog-
nitive level that have the potential to result in concrete changes at a later stage. In addition, 
the Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation Influence offers a framework to examine the different 
underlying processes through which evaluations influence broader outcomes at the cognitive, 
motivational and behavioural level, which should ultimately result in social betterment. The un-
derlying mechanisms of the Comprehensive Theory of Evaluation use are also represented in the 
proposed conceptual framework. Finally, the literature on knowledge/research – policy inter-
face draws the attention to the different factors that play a role in knowledge/research interface, 
as well as strategies CSOs are using to bring M&E evidence to the attention of the policymakers. 
The proposed framework takes into account the importance of context, as identified in chapter 
three and four, for understanding the environment in which CSOs are carrying out M&E activi-
ties, the type of M&E they are carrying out and their capacity to transform the gathered M&E 
evidence in a tool to increase accountability and influence (pro-poor) programmes and policies 
in the broad sense of the word. 
The framework draws its strength from the fact that it reflects elements from a 
broad range of literature, and takes into account both the accountability and the feedback func-
tion of M&E. As the framework is still work in progress, however, future research and fieldwork 
on CSO-led M&E are necessary to fine-tune some of the elements of the framework. First, the 
paper was structured in such way that both main functions of M&E were discussed separately. 
Nevertheless, as indicated by the dark grey arrow in the figure (see figure 6), dynamics and trade-
offs between both functions exist. CSOs that are engaged in expenditure tracking, for example, 
to ensure the good use of resources of a certain programme, may be able to introduce improve-
ments in that programme through a combination of their M&E evidence, advocacy and dialogue. 
Additional research, especially empirical research, is needed to further explore the interaction 
between both functions.  Second, the framework also chose to take M&E evidence generated 
by CSOs, as a starting point for studying accountability and feedback. As a consequence, the 
‘process use’ of M&E receives less attention in the framework. Being involved in M&E activities IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03 • 49 Towards an UndersTanding of Csos’ involvemenT in moniToring & evalUaTion
itself, independently of the knowledge gathered, can also have an influence on CSOs and pos-
sibly on broader political processes. In the same line, the paper chose to focus on the ‘external’ 
feedback function for improved programmes and policies, at the expense of studying the use of 
M&E evidence for ‘internal’ organizational learning. Despite these two challenges, the proposed 
framework is a good starting point to study CSO-led M&E in different settings, and, hopefully, a 
source of inspiration for further research on the topic.50 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2011-03  TOwarDs an unDersTanDIng Of csOs’ InvOlvemenT In mOnITOrIng & evaluaTIOn
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